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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BY STEALTH 
 
RICHARD ALBERT† 
  
Constitutional amendment ordinarily channels public deliberation through formal, 
transparent and predictable procedures designed to express the informed aggregated choices of 
political, popular and institutional actors. Yet the Government of Canada’s proposed senator 
selection reforms concealed a democratically problematic strategy to innovate an informal, 
obscure and irregular method of constitutional amendment: constitutional amendment by stealth. 
There are three distinguishing features of constitutional amendment by stealth—distinctions that 
make stealth amendment stand apart from other types of informal constitutional change: the 
circumvention of formal amendment rules, the intentional creation of a convention, and the 
twinned consequences of both promoting and weakening democracy. Constitutional amendment 
by stealth occurs where political actors consciously establish a new democratic practice whose 
repetition is intended to compel their successors into compliance. Over time, this practice 
matures into an unwritten constitutional convention, and consequently becomes informally 
entrenched in the constitution, though without the democratic legitimacy we commonly associate 
with an amendment. In this Article, I theorize constitutional amendment by stealth from legal, 
theoretical and comparative perspectives, and consider its consequences for the rule of law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Formal amendment rules have been the subject of great controversy in contemporary 
constitutional politics in Canada. From the patriation of the Constitution in 1982, to the nearly-
ratified 1987 Meech Lake Accord and the similarly unsuccessful 1992 Charlottetown Accord,1 
and through the Supreme Court’s Secession Reference in 1998,2 formal amendment rules have 
been at the center of deep legal, political and indeed moral disagreement in Canada.3  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent Senate Reference continues the modern trend.4 
The constitutional questions on which the Court was asked to advise the Government of Canada 
focused squarely on the design and interpretation of the formal amendment rules entrenched in 
the Constitution Act, 1982.5 The questions concerned the constitutional requirements for 
imposing senatorial term limits, repealing the property qualification for senators, abolishing the 
Senate, and implementing a framework of consultative provincial elections that would inform 
prime ministerial nominations.6 In this Article, I focus only with the last of these questions. 
 
The nub of the issue concerned whether Parliament may constitutionally deploy its 
limited power of unilateral formal amendment under Section 44 to make alterations to the 
method of prime ministerial nominations to the Senate of Canada, or whether Parliament is 
required to adhere to the more exacting multilateral formal amendment procedures defined in 
either Sections 38 or 41?7 In my view, the answer was always clear.8 As I argued at the 2013 
Constitutional Cases Conference at Osgoode Hall before the Court rendered its advisory opinion, 
Section 44—which authorizes Parliament to amend the Constitution of Canada “in relation to the 
executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons”9—is not the right 
vehicle for amendments to the method of filling vacancies in the Senate of Canada: 
 
[T]he escalating and federalist structure of formal amendment entrenched in the 
architecture of Canada’s formal amendment rules suggests that it was illegitimate 
to use Section 44 to make a formal amendment to an element of Canadian 
democracy as significant as senator selection. Using the default multilateral 
amendment rule in Section 38 is more consistent with Canadian history, the 
evolution of the design of formal amendment rules in Canada, and the centrality 
of federalism to democratic self-government.10 
 
                                                 
1
 Ronald L. Watts, “Canada: Three Decades of Periodic Federal Crises” (1996) 17 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 353 at 355-63. 
2
 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [Secession Reference]. 
3
 See Peter Oliver, “Canada, Quebec and Constitutional Amendment” (1999) 49 U. Toronto L.J. 519 at 519. 
4
 Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32 [Senate Reference]. 
5
 Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1982”). 
6
 Senate Reference, supra note 4, at para. 2. 
7
 Ibid. at para. 5.  
8
 For a description of the various formal amendment procedures and their associated thresholds, see infra Section 
II.A. 
9
 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 44. 
10
 Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States” (2014) 64 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 181 at 
218. 
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I suggested that the Government of Canada’s recourse to the unilateral formal amendment power 
under Section 44 “reflects a disjuncture between legality and legitimacy.”11 I argued that 
although a purely formalist and strictly legalistic reading of the Constitution could indicate that 
Parliament may pursue Senate reform through Section 44, political history and constitutional 
design counsel that it would be illegitimate, whether legal or not. I concluded that “in invoking 
this unilateral federal amendment power to formally amend Senate selection, the Government of 
Canada has either misunderstood Parliament’s constitutional authority or attempted to achieve 
unilaterally what it is constitutionally required to pursue multilaterally.”12  
 
The Court later concluded in its Senate Reference “that Parliament cannot unilaterally 
achieve most of the proposed changes to the Senate, which require [recourse to Section 38].”13 
Then as now, it was difficult to imagine the Court arriving at any other conclusion. The Court’s 
advisory opinion was constitutionally correct in its interpretation of the structure of formal 
amendment under the Constitution Act, 1982, it was well-reasoned in its answers to each of the 
six reference questions, and it was politically prudent in requiring political actors to work 
cooperatively toward Senate reform pursuant to the text’s formally entrenched multilateral 
amendment procedures. Yet in directing its attention methodically to the six reference questions, 
the Court missed an opportunity to bring to light the larger and more fundamental constitutional 
infirmities with the Government of Canada’s Senate reform ambitions.14  
 
I stress here that the Government of Canada’s Senate reform ambitions are not troubling 
in and of themselves. The Senate of Canada is in dire need of reform. As Ned Franks has 
recognized, the Senate is “a frustrating puzzle” and “the most criticized institution of government 
in Canada.”15 It is therefore with good reason that the Senate has been the subject of sustained 
debate since the adoption of Canada’s founding constitution in 1867.16 Only seven years into 
Confederation, the House of Commons was already debating Senate reform.17 Shortly thereafter 
at the first intergovernmental conference, critics charged that the Senate was failing to meet the 
federalism-reinforcing objectives its designers had set for it.18 Paul Weiler subsequently captured 
the dominant sentiment of the twentieth century,19 observing that “just about everyone (except 
perhaps a few senators) would concede that the Canadian senate has not proved an effective 
                                                 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. at 213-14. 
13
 Senate Reference, supra note 4, at para. 4. 
14
 The Supreme Court has historically answered reference questions expansively not narrowly, which militates 
against the view that Court should have taken such a modest approach in the Senate Reference. See generally James 
L. Huffman & MardiLyn Saathoff, “Advisory Opinions and Canadian Constitutional Development: The Supreme 
Court’s Reference Jurisdiction” (1990) 74 Minn. L. Rev. 1251 (tracing the history of the Supreme Court’s reference 
jurisdiction and case law). 
15
 C.E.S. Franks, “The Senate and its Reform” (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 454 at 454. 
16
 Robert A. MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1926) at 1. 
17
 Serge Joyal,, “Reflections on the Path to Senate Reform” (1999) 22 Can. Parl. Rev. 2 at 2. 
18
 See Michael Crommelin, “Senate Reform: Is the Game Worth the Candle?”(1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 197 at 197. 
19
 See, e.g., George William Ross, The Senate of Canada: Its Constitution, Powers and Duties Historically 
Considered (Toronto: Copp, Clark Company, 1914) at 91-108; Henry S. Albinski, “The Canadian Senate: Politics 
and the Constitution” (1963) 57 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 378 at 378; E. Russell Hopkins, “What’s Right about the Senate” 
(1961) 8 McGill L.J. 167 at 167-168. 
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representative of regional views in the central government.”20 The same critique endures today,21 
as the Senate prepares to mark its one hundredth and fiftieth anniversary in 2017. Senate reform 
proposals themselves are therefore far from troubling—they are both welcome and necessary.  
 
What is troubling, however, is how the Government has sought to pursue its Senate 
reform ambitions. The Government of Canada’s proposed Senate selection reforms—the 
predicate for the Senate Reference—concealed a broader strategy to innovate an unusual method 
of constitutional amendment: constitutional amendment by stealth. Constitutional amendment 
ordinarily channels public deliberation through formal, transparent and predictable procedures 
designed to express the informed aggregated choices of political actors. But the Government of 
Canada appears to have calculated that the difficulty of formal amendment made its Senate 
reform objectives best achievable through informal and irregular procedures designed both to 
circumvent the textually prescribed rules for formal amendment and to affect a material change 
to the Constitution of Canada. A constitutional amendment occurs by stealth when political 
actors consciously establish a new political practice whose repetition is intended to compel 
successors to conform their conduct to that practice. Over time, this practice matures into an 
unwritten constitutional convention that becomes informally entrenched in the constitution, 
though without the popular legitimacy we commonly associate with a constitutional amendment.  
 
There are three distinguishing features of constitutional amendment by stealth—
distinctions that make stealth amendment stand apart from other types of informal constitutional 
change: the circumvention of formal amendment rules, the intentional creation of a convention, 
and the twinned consequences of both promoting and weakening democracy. I explain each 
below in greater detail but a short word now may be useful. First, where political actors believe, 
correctly or not, that it is too difficult to use the formal amendment rules to entrench an 
amendment-level change, they resort to alternative informal means. Second, as a consequence of 
the difficulty of formal amendment, political actors circumvent the onerous formal amendment 
rules in the constitutional text and opt instead to create a new democratic practice. Political 
actors intend this new practice to mature into a constitutional convention that will coerce their 
successors into compliance. Third, the convention that political actors seek to create is hard to 
resist because it enhances democracy. At its origin, though, the convention risks undermining 
democracy because it arises from a circumvention of the constitution’s formal amendment rules. 
 
Here, the Government of Canada, which I will henceforth identify as the “Conservative 
government,” has long sought to replace senatorial appointments with democratic elections. But 
recognizing the virtual impossibility of formally amending the Constitution to create an elected 
Senate, the Conservative government instead sought to create a political practice to achieve the 
same end: the prime minister would fill Senate vacancies only with candidates who had been 
endorsed in province-wide popular elections, pursuant to a parliamentary law creating a 
framework for consultative senatorial elections. As the democracy-promoting practice of voting 
for provincial senatorial nominees came to be viewed as encouraging civic participation and as 
                                                 
20
 Paul C. Weiler, “Confederation Discontents and Constitutional Reform: The Case of the Second Chamber” (1979) 
29 U. Toronto. L.J. 253 at 262. 
21
 See, e.g., J. Patrick Boyer, Our Scandalous Senate (Toronto, Canada: Dundurn Press, 2014) at 213; Donald J. 
Savoie, “Fix, don’t Axe, the Senate”, Policy Options (September-October 2013) at 7-8; Brad Wall, “Time to 
Consider Abolition of the Senate” (2013) 36 Can. Parl. Rev. 6 at 7. 
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enhancing the sociological legitimacy of the institution, future prime ministers would feel 
constrained to continue to the practice, and that practice would over time mature into a 
constitutional convention. What would be lost in the entrenchment of this democratic convention 
is that it had been devised by political actors in response to the impossibility of creating an 
elected Senate in the only way the Constitution permits: by formal amendment. This “stealth 
amendment” would have been simultaneously democracy-promoting and democracy-deficient: 
the politically expedient strategy to democratize the Senate would have given voters a voice in 
the selection of their senators yet this democracy-promoting outcome would have been achieved 
by a constitutionally unsound circumvention of the textual rules for formal amendment.  
 
As important as it is to make Canadian public institutions more democratic, the ends here 
would not have justified the means. An elected Senate is a worthy objective but not if the process 
by which we achieve it is itself devoid of democratic legitimacy. The formal amendment rules 
entrenched in the Constitution of Canada set the standard for legitimacy: in order to meet the 
test, political actors must follow the carefully detailed sequence and thresholds to make a 
material change to the Constitution. The purposeful evasion of those rules undermines both the 
Constitution and the new change created by the evasion. The Conservative government’s plan to 
establish, by unilateral amendment, a framework for provincial senatorial elections violated both 
the federalist principles underlying the Constitution as well as the Constitution’s peremptory rule 
that the method of senatorial selection may be amended only by multilateral formal amendment. 
 
There were both intrinsic and instrumental reasons why the Conservative government 
sought to amend the Constitution in this way. For long, the constituents of the Conservative 
Party and its modern precursor parties, including the Progressive-Conservative Party, Reform 
Party and the Canadian Alliance, have called for reforms to the Senate’s functions, seat 
distribution and method of appointment.22 The Conservative government’s recent proposals for 
Senate elections are an incremental step toward fulfilling its larger vision for institutional reform. 
As an instrumental matter, senatorial elections also give the Conservative Party some measure of 
insurance against the possibility of defeat in the House of Commons. Today, the Conservative 
Party enjoys the benefit of a fractured left, with the Liberal, New Democratic and Green parties 
dividing the vote. But this vote-split will not endure, just as the vote-split on the right did not. In 
the event that parts or all of the left unite, the Conservative Party will see its institutional 
advantage evaporate, in which case it could lose the power to nominate senators.23 In the face of 
that contingency—a contingency that is attracting increasing coverage24—the motivation for the 
Conservative government’s proposal for senatorial elections becomes clear: to decouple control 
of the House of Commons from control of the Senate, by requiring a direct vote for senators.  
                                                 
22
 For recent work on the history of the Senate reform movement, see Bob Plamondon, Full Circle: Death and 
Resurrection in Canadian Conservative Politics (Key Porter Books Ltd., 2006) at 51-145; Blair Armitage, “A Means 
to Many Ends: Why Iterative Reform of the Senate is So Difficult” (Master’s Thesis, Carleton University, 2014) at 
96-111, online: https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/theses/31886.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
23
 As a formal matter, senators are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the prime minister. See 
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), pt. IV, s. 24 (hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”). 
24
 See, e.g., Aaron Wherry, “Why Not a Coalition? Or at Least an Accord?”, Maclean’s (Mar. 19, 2015), online: 
http://www.macleans.ca/politics/why-wouldnt-the-liberals-and-ndp-cooperate-to-replace-stephen-harper (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015); Pierre Saint-Arnaud, “NDP Leader Tom Mulcair Remains Open to Liberal Alliance to Knock Out 
Tories”, Toronto Star (Mar. 18, 2015), online: http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/03/18/ndp-leader-tom-
mulcair-remains-open-to-liberal-alliance-to-knock-out-tories.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
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Whether these Senate reforms are a good idea is of little relevance to the fundamental 
question: are the means and ends of Senate reform consistent with the Constitution of Canada?25 
Fortunately, the Court in the Senate Reference foiled the Conservative government’s bid to 
amend the Constitution by stealth. But there is no guarantee that a future Court will rule 
similarly, nor that political actors will again seek permission or advice by way of a reference for 
answers to whether and how they may make small- or large-scale constitutional amendments. 
The failure of this stealth amendment is best viewed neither as a victory nor a loss for particular 
political actors but rather as an opportunity to learn about the pathologies of formal amendment 
under the Constitution of Canada, how those pathologies drive stealth amendment, and why 
Canadian political actors might find stealth amendment a profitable strategy for constitutional 
change. These are important questions that the Court did not address in its reference. 
 
In this Article, I fill the void in the Court’s careful yet incomplete advisory opinion by 
introducing, theorizing and illustrating this unconventional form of constitutional amendment 
pursued by Conservative government. I begin in Part II by examining constitutional amendment 
in Canada, with a focus on the difficulty of formal amendment and the prevalence of informal 
amendment. In Part III, I explain the Conservative government’s Senate reform objectives with 
particular emphasis on the proposal to create a framework for senatorial elections. In Part IV, I 
theorize constitutional amendment by stealth and explain how the Conservative government’s 
proposed senator selection reforms reflect an effort to amend the Constitution by stealth in 
circumvention of the deliberative procedures the constitutional text demands. I also draw from 
comparative perspectives to distinguish stealth amendment from other forms of informal 
constitutional change. I conclude Part IV with attention to the costs and consequences of stealth 
amendment. In Part V, I offer closing thoughts on constitutional amendment in Canada.   
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA 
 
Formal amendment rules are fundamental to written constitutionalism.26 In constitutional 
democracies,27 formal amendment rules perform an essential corrective function:28 they 
authorize political actors to remedy discovered faults in the constitutional text in conformity with 
transparent procedures.29 At their best, formal amendment rules also distinguish constitutional 
                                                 
25
 As I will suggest in this Article, process and purpose must each meet the test of legitimacy in order for a 
constitutional change to satisfy the requirements of democratic constitutionalism. Although this stealth senatorial 
amendment is not as deeply problematic as the formally constitutional changes we see occurring at the constitutional 
and sub-constitutional levels around the world, this stealth amendment does reflect the same kind of general problem 
that risks undermining constitutional democracy. For two excellent papers on the use of democratic procedures to 
achieve non-democratic ends, see David Landau, “Abusive Constitutionalism” (2013) 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 189; 
Ozan O. Varol, “Stealth Authoritarianism” (2015) 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2014. 
26
 John Burgess, I Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1891) at 137. 
27
 The functional uses of formal amendment rules in sham constitutional are much less clear. For a study of the 
forms and uses of constitutionalism in authoritarian constitutions, see David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, 
“Constitutional Variation among Strains of Authoritarianism” in Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 
Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 165-95. 
28
 Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem” in Tom 
Ginsburg, ed., Comparative Constitutional Design (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 195 at 195. 
29
 Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, “The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David 
Strauss” (2002) 77 Tul. L. Rev. 247 at 275. 
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from ordinary law,30 promote public discourse about constitutional interpretation,31 aggregate 
and translate popular preferences through public institutions,32 precommit political actors,33 
check informal amendments that occur extra-constitutionally,34 and express constitutional 
values.35 Formal amendment rules therefore serve both symbolic and functional purposes. 
 
In Canada, formal amendment rules serve each of these functions, at least in theory. But 
constitutional amendment in Canada is also special. Canada is one of only a few democratic 
constitutional states to entrench the restricted multi-track amendment framework, which assigns 
amendment procedures of varying difficulty to specific provisions or principles.36 It is equally 
worth noting that constitutional change in Canada has developed informally in unusual ways, not 
only as a consequence of evolving constitutional conventions,37 which is true of most if not all 
constitutional democracies,38 but more interestingly as a result of constitutional desuetude.39 
Canada also finds itself among a shrinking number of countries without a theory or doctrine of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment, something that only adds to Canada’s uniqueness.40 
 
 What is most relevant for our purposes, however, is that the Constitution of Canada is 
one of the world’s most difficult to amend, earning the top score on Arend Lijphart’s index of 
constitutional rigidity.41 Yet what remains unappreciated about the difficulty of formal 
amendment in Canada is that the source of the Constitution’s rigidity is not its formal 
amendment rules alone, which are admittedly exceedingly onerous. It is that those rules have 
been rendered even more demanding as a result of judicial interpretation, statutory enactment, 
and arguably also by constitutional convention.42 This extraordinary difficulty of formal 
amendment in Canada has consequently given rise to informal methods of amendment.43 In this 
Part, I explain and evaluate constitutional amendment in Canada with a view to setting the 
                                                 
30
 András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Budapest, Hungary: Central European 
University Press, 1999) at 39-40. 
31
 Raymond Ku, “Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change” (1995) 64 Fordham L. 
Rev. 535 at 571. 
32
 Walter Dellinger, “The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process” (1983) 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 386 at 431. 
33
 Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 101-04. 
34
 Rosalind Dixon, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective” in Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind 
Dixon, eds., Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2011) 96 at 97. 
35
 Richard Albert, “The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2013) 59 McGill L.J. 225 at 236. 
36
 Richard Albert, “The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2014) 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 913 at 944-
46.  
37
 Richard Albert, “Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules” (forthcoming 2015) 13 Int’l J. Const. L. 
38
 Richard Albert, “How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions” (currently under review).  
39
 Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude” (2014) 62 Am. J. Comp. 641 at 656-
69.  
40
 Richard Albert, “The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (currently 
under review).  
41
 Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999) at 220. 
42
 Elsewhere, I explain in detail why formal amendment in Canada is harder than the constitutional text suggests. 
See Richard Albert, “Formal Amendment Difficulty in Canada” (currently under review). 
43
 See Allan C. Hutchinson, “Constitutional Change and Constitutional Amendment: A Canadian Condundrum” in 
Xenophon Contiades, ed., Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and 
the USA (Abington, UK: Routledge 2013) 51 at 57-70. 
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foundation for understanding how and why political actors would seek to innovate an 
unconventional method of informal amendment: constitutional amendment by stealth. 
A. The Difficulty of Formal Amendment 
 
Measuring formal amendment difficulty is itself a difficult task.44 The limitations of 
existing cross-national formal amendment classifications illustrate the challenge of measuring 
amendment difficulty. As I have shown, some classifications are overinclusive, others are 
underinclusive, and still others are both, resulting in oversimplifications that elide over important 
nuances that can either moderate or exacerbate formal amendment difficulty.45 For example, 
Edward Schneier’s important classification categorizes Canada with New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom, whose traditionally unwritten constitutions are associated with amendment 
ease,46 risking the false suggestion that Canada’s own formal amendment rules are similarly easy 
to satisfy.47 Donald Lutz has observed that Canada’s partially written and unwritten constitution 
poses a particular challenge for measuring amendment difficulty—namely how to determine 
what does or does not possess constitutional status in Canada—and this, in his view, makes it 
harder to measure amendment difficulty here than in most other constitutional democracies.48  
 
 Formal amendment in Canada is “unusually complicated,”49 to quote an authority on 
amendment in the United States, which is thought to have one of the world’s most rigid 
constitutions.50 The strongest critique of the difficulty of formal amendment in Canada is the 
country’s lived experience: Canadian political actors succeeded in making historic constitutional 
changes in 1982, when Canada nationalized its constitution by creating made-in-Canada formal 
amendment rules and entrenching the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.51 Yet history 
has shown that Michael Stein was right to question, shortly after the major multilateral 
constitutional changes in Canada in 1982, whether those changes would “prove to be only a 
Pyrrhic victory, a largely symbolic success that will effectively bring the process to a halt.”52 
Since then, all major multilateral constitutional changes in Canada have met with failure. 
 
Michael Lusztig’s theory of mass input/legitimization best explains why major 
multilateral constitutional amendment is virtually impossible today in Canada.53 Lusztig begins 
                                                 
44
 See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, “Cultures of Amendment and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment 
Difficulty” (forthcoming 2015) 13 Int’l J. Const. L. 
45
 See Albert, supra note 36, at 918-28. 
46
 Astrid Lorenz, “How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two Alternatives (2005) 17 J. 
Theoretical Pol. 339 at 359. 
47
 Edward Schneier, Crafting Constitutional Democracies (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006). 
48
 Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 179 
n.16. 
49
 Walter Dellinger, “The Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Perspective” (1982) 
45 L. & Contemp. Probs. 283 at 297. 
50
 Zachary Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) at 101.  
51
 Edward McWhinney, “The Constitutional Patriation Project, 1980-82” (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 241 at 252. 
52
 Michael B. Stein, “Canadian Constitutional Reform, 1927-1982: A Comparative Case Analysis Over Time” 
(1984) 14 Publius 121 at 139. 
53
 See Michael Lusztig, “Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional Initiatives are Doomed to Fail” 
(1994) 27 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 747 at 748. 
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by observing that major amendment requires an extraordinarily deep and broad level of 
agreement by political actors.54 In addition to these demanding expectations, the prospect of 
major multilateral amendment efforts creates incentives for multiple constituencies to mobilize 
behind their interests in order to attain special status for themselves and to entrench that status in 
the product of those amendment efforts.55 An additional complication results: the conferral of 
special status on one group makes it difficult to deny similar status to other groups.56 This leads 
to near-certain amendment failure for major multilateral formal amendment efforts involving 
fundamental or constitutive principles, the polity’s constitutional identity, or the framework and 
interrelations of public institutions.57 Lusztig and Christopher Manfredi therefore anticipate 
amendment failure for major multilateral amendments because political actors will make 
incompatible and intractable demands both on the subject of the major amendment efforts 
themselves and on collateral issues of significance to their constituencies.58 
 
 That Canada has five formal amendment procedures—each one in lockstep more difficult 
to than the former—is more of a complicating than clarifying feature of its amendment rules. It is 
not always obvious which procedure must be used to formally amend a particular provision or 
principle, as the Senate Reference illustrates.59 The easiest procedure applies exclusively to 
formal amendments to provincial constitutions: the unilateral provincial procedure ensures that 
“the legislature of each province may exclusively make laws amending the constitution of the 
province.”60 Next, the unilateral federal procedure in Section 44 authorizes the Parliament of 
Canada to unilaterally formally amend the Constitution “in relation to the executive government 
of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons.”61 This procedure may not be used to amend 
matters expressly assigned to another, more difficult, amendment procedure.62  
 
The third amendment procedure—the parliamentary-provincial procedure in Section 
43—is deployable for regional matters. It must be used for formal amendments whose subject 
matter implicates “one or more, but not all, provinces,” for instance an amendment concerning 
provincial boundaries, the use of English or French within a province, or the public funding of 
provincial religious schools.63 This threshold requires approval resolutions of both the House of 
                                                 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid. For example, the Charlottetown Accord satisfied Quebec’s demand for a recognition of its distinctiveness 
but this undermined the western provinces’ demand for provincial equality—a demand that the Charlottetown 
Accord entrenched by giving all provinces a veto over constitutional amendments and also by making side payments 
to western Canada as additional compensation. Ibid. at 761. 
57
 Christopher P. Manfredi & Michael Lusztig, “Why do Formal Amendments Fail? An Institutional Analysis” 
(1998) 50 World Politics 377 at 380; see also David R. Cameron & Jacqueline D. Krikorian, “Recognizing Quebec 
in the Constitution of Canada: Using the Bilateral Constitutional Amendment Process” (2008) 58 U. Toronto L.J. 
389 at 394. 
58
 See Manfredi & Lusztig, supra note 57, at 399. 
59
 Senate Reference, supra note 4, at para. 5.  
60
 Constitution Ac, 1982, pt. V, at s. 45. 
61
 Ibid. at s. 44. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Ibid. at s. 43. Although the use of Section 43 in connection with funding to public religious schools is not 
specified in the constitutional text, it has been upheld by courts in both Newfoundland and Quebec. See Hogan v. 
Newfoundland (Attorney General), (2000) 183 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 
[2000] SCCA No. 191; Potter v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2001] R.J.Q. 2823 (Que. C.A.), leaving to appeal to 
SCC refused, [2002] SCCR no. 13. 
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Commons and the Senate, and of the unicameral provincial legislature or legislatures involved in 
the amendment.64 The next-most onerous procedure is the default multilateral amendment rule in 
Section 38.65 It requires approval resolutions from both houses of Parliament in addition to 
resolutions from the provincial legislatures of at least seven of Canada’s ten provinces,66 where 
the population of the ratifying provinces must amount to at least half of their total aggregate 
population.67 Political actors must use this threshold to amend senator selection and eligibility, 
Senate powers and provincial representation, the Supreme Court of Canada, proportional 
provincial representation in the House of Commons, and provincial-territorial boundaries.68 This 
threshold is the Constitution’s default amendment rule, and political actors must therefore use it 
to formally amend all parts of the Constitution not specifically assigned to another rule.69 
 
The most difficult formal amendment procedure is the unanimity threshold in Section 
41.70 It requires unanimous consent from federal and provincial political actors with approval 
resolutions from both the House of Commons and the Senate, and from each of the provincial 
legislatures.71 This threshold applies to the most important provisions and principles in Canadian 
constitutionalism: the structure and institutions of Canada’s constitutional monarchy; provincial 
representation in the House of Commons and the Senate, subject to related but lesser matters 
amendable by another specially designated lower threshold; the use of English or French, subject 
to the same qualification; the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, subject again to the 
same qualification; and the entire structure of the formal amendment rules themselves.72 The 
architecture of formal amendment in Canada is therefore intricate in its escalating design. 
 
Successfully adopting a multilateral formal amendment under either the general default 
or unanimity procedures requires constitutional politics to perform heroics. One scholar 
describes it as “largely impossible.”73 These demanding multilateral ratification thresholds have 
been satisfied only once since the entrenchment of Canada’s formal amendment rules over three 
decades ago.74 The overwhelming supermajority of amendments has occurred using the 
parliamentary-provincial and unilateral federal amendment rules, both of which are much easier 
to fulfill than the multilateral procedures designated for major constitutional changes.75 The most 
recent successful formal amendment occurred in 2011, when Parliament deployed its unilateral 
                                                 
64
 Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, at s. 43. 
65
 Ibid. at s. 38. 
66
 Ibid. at s. 38(1). 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid. at s. 42(1). 
69
 Ibid. at s. 38. 
70
 Ibid. at s. 41. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Bettina Petersohn, “Constitutional Reform and Federal Dynamics: Causes and Effects” in Arthur Benz & Jörg 
Broschek, eds., Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 297 at 316. 
74
 See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., Vol. 1 (loose-leaf updated 2012, release 1) (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2007) at 1-7—1-8 n.32. 
75
 See Ian Greene, “Constitutional Amendment in Canada and the United States” in Stephen L. Newman, ed., 
Constitutional Politics in Canada and the United States (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004) at 
254. 
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formal amendment power under Section 44 to adjust the number of Members of Parliament 
consistent with the principle of proportionate provincial representation.76 
B. The Prevalence of Informal Amendment 
 
In Canada, as in other constitutional states, the difficulty of formal amendment has 
pushed constitutional change “off the books,”77 forcing political actors to update the constitution 
in ways that do not manifest themselves in a new constitutional writing. These unwritten 
changes, or informal amendments, alter the meaning of the Constitution of Canada in the absence 
of a textual modification.78 We can understand the impulse for informal amendment in terms of 
hydraulic pressure, as Heather Gerken describes it: where the path to formal amendment is 
blocked as a result of onerous procedures or unachievable majorities, the rigidity of the formal 
amendment rules will redirect the energies of political actors into alternative channels that will 
produce the same or similar outcome, albeit in a different form.79 These informal amendments 
may occur, for instance, by judicial interpretation, national legislation, executive decision, 
implication, convention and desuetude.80 The functional result of an informal amendment is 
indistinguishable from a formal amendment insofar as both are binding on political actors.81  
 
In Canada, informal amendment has become the primary vehicle for constitutional 
change in the face of the near-impossibility of formal amendment. As Allan Hutchinson 
explains, informal amendments “occur even though the formal process of constitutional change 
itself remains unused and unchanged.”82 The source for these informal changes has often been 
the judiciary. Courts, writes Hutchinson, “have become the preferred site for effecting important 
changes in the constitutional order.”83 Hutchinson remarks that informal amendment via judicial 
interpretation is a “less democratic”84 means for constitutional change than the legislative 
procedures authorized by the constitutional text, which require multiple expressions of popular 
will mediated by representative institutions: “[i]n a society that claims to be devoted to the ideas 
and practice of democratic legitimacy, it is far from clear why the courts are the suitable or 
appropriate institution to speak and act on the people’s behalf.”85 
 
One need not agree with Hutchinson’s critique of the judiciary to recognize that informal 
amendment today prevails over formal amendment. Hutchinson demonstrates that “while almost 
none of the wording of the Constitution Act 1867 has changed in more than 125 years, the 
meaning and effect of its provisions on the division of provincial and federal powers have gone 
through a process of continuing redefinition.”86 For example, the historical interpretation of the 
                                                 
76
 See Fair Representation Act, S.C. 2011, c. 26. 
77
 Stephen M. Griffin, “The Nominee is … Article V” (1995) 12 Const. Comment. 171 at 172. 
78
 See Heather K. Gerken, “The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic 
Constitution” (2007) 55 Drake L. Rev. 925 at 929. 
79
 Ibid. at 927. 
80
 See Richard Albert, “Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V” (2014) 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1029 at 
1060-77. 
81
 See Richard A. Primus, “When Should Original Meanings Matter?” (2008) 107 Mich. L. Rev. 165 at 210 n.158. 
82
 Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 57. 
83
 Ibid. at 57. 
84
 Ibid. at 56. 
85
 Ibid. at 57. 
86
 Ibid. at 61. 
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“peace, order and good government power” shows that the meaning of a static constitutional text 
itself can change over time.87 Similarly, the interpretation of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 in R. v. Sparrow88 prompts us to wonder “in what substantive, as opposed to formal, ways 
an amendment of the constitution would differ from it.”89 Many of these redefinitions have 
occurred by judicial interpretation, whose effect is virtually identical to an actual amendment. 
Indeed, writes Hutchinson, “it is difficult to pin down the difference in the substantive effects of 
the formal acts of amending the Constitution and the informal acts of interpreting it.”90  
 
There are two important qualifications to make to Hutchinson’s observations on the 
prevalence of informal amendment. Both concern the distinction between informal amendment 
and judicial interpretation. First, it is necessary to distinguish informal amendment by judicial 
interpretation from judicial interpretation itself because not all judicial interpretation results in an 
informal amendment. The difference turns on the court in which the interpretation occurs: 
informal amendment by judicial interpretation occurs where the Supreme Court interprets the 
Constitution as a final matter; in contrast, judicial interpretation by lower courts is generally not 
nationally binding and it is therefore less accurate to define it as an informal amendment.91 
Second, even at the Supreme Court level, not all constitutional interpretation affects an informal 
amendment: the clearest case of an informal amendment by judicial interpretation occurs where 
the Supreme Court confers constitutional status upon an unwritten constitutional principle by 
subordinating duly-passed legislation to that unwritten rule.92 In such a case, there is no 
functional difference in constitutional effect between a textual rule entrenched in the constitution 
by formal amendment and an unwritten rule entrenched by judicial interpretation. 
C. The Informal Amendment of Formal Amendment Rules 
 
Canada’s already onerous formal amendment rules have themselves been informally 
amended to make them even harder than even their text suggests. The Secession93 and Nadon 
References94 are two recent illustrations of the Court’s power to informally amend the 
Constitution of Canada and more specifically the Constitution’s formal amendment rules. In both 
cases, the Court imposed additional constraints on political actors engaged in formally amending 
the Constitution of Canada. In the Secession Reference, the Court informally entrenched the duty 
to negotiate and identified federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and 
respect for minority rights as a handful of “underlying constitutional principles” that must govern 
the formal amendment process in connection with a provincial secession.95 This judicial 
                                                 
87
 Ibid. at 62. 
88
 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
89
 Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 67. 
90
 Ibid. at 61. 
91
 In some instances, judicial interpretation is never final given that the Court’s interpretation may be effectively 
overturned, at least temporarily but theoretically indefinitely, by recourse to the Notwithstanding Clause. See 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 33. But the Clause has become largely inoperable. See Richard Albert, “Advisory 
Review” (2008) 45 Alberta L. Rev. 1037 at 1052-54. 
92
 See Tsvi Kahana, “Canada” in Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro, eds., How Constitutions Change: A Comparative 
Study (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing Ltd., 2011) 9 at 33. 
93
 Secession Reference, supra note 2.  
94
 See Reference re Supreme Court Act, 2014 SCC 21, at paras. 90-105 [Nadon Reference]. 
95
 Secession Reference, supra note 2, at paras. 88-105. 
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interpretation amounts to an informal amendment insofar as these obligations now bind political 
actors in the same way they would were they formally entrenched in the constitutional text.96 
 
In the Nadon Reference, the Court further complicated formal amendments to itself.97 
The Supreme Court informally entrenched its own essential features—which for the Court 
include, “at the very least, the Court’s jurisdiction as the final general court of appeal for Canada, 
including in matters of constitutional interpretation, and its independence”98—against formal 
amendment by any other mechanism than Section 41’s difficult unanimity procedure.99 Here, the 
Court’s interpretation clarified an open-textured constitutional provision that had once been 
susceptible to competing interpretations. Today, however, there is only one legal interpretation, 
and though it is not textually entrenched it is nonetheless binding on political actors. 
 
Quite apart from their informal amendment by judicial interpretation, Canada’s formal 
amendment rules have also been informally amended by parliamentary, provincial and territorial 
legislation. In 1996, Parliament adopted the regional veto law, which confers veto power to 
provinces or regions—the Atlantic provinces, Ontario, Quebec, the Prairie provinces and British 
Columbia—in major constitutional reforms achieved via Section 38.100 This veto law fulfilled 
the then-prime minister’s pledge to grant Quebec a veto on major constitutional reforms—a 
pledge made against the backdrop of Quebec’s near-successful referendum on secession in 
1995.101 Under the law prevents, no cabinet minister in the Government of Canada may propose 
a constitutional amendment pursuant to the multilateral amendment procedure in Section 38 
without first securing the consent of a majority of the provinces, including British Columbia, 
Ontario and Quebec, along with Alberta by implication of the current distribution of provincial 
population.102 Although the regional veto law is an ordinary statute that may be repealed by an 
ordinary law, it nevertheless constrains the formal amendment process by adding a requirement 
that is not written into the master text of the Constitution of Canada but is now effectively 
informally entrenched within it.103 Relatedly, provinces and territories have adopted their own 
laws on national formal amendment: several now require a binding or advisory referendum on a 
                                                 
96
 Indeed, in an important analysis of the Secession Reference, Donna Greshner asks whether the principles the 
Court recognized as binding on political actors in connection with secession can “contradict or override the writes of 
the constitution?” She answers, correctly in my view, that “the opinion’s message is that principles are more 
important than rules, notwithstanding the pronouncements about the primacy of the text.” Donna Greshner, “The 
Quebec Secession Reference: Goodbye to Part V?” (1998) 10 Const. Forum 19 at 23. 
97
 Whether a formal amendment affects a change to the essential features of the Court will of course depend on how 
the Court interprets that amendment, specifically whether it requires conformity with the general default or the 
unanimity amendment procedure. 
98
 Reference re Supreme Court Act, supra note 94, at para. 94. 
99
 Ibid. at paras. 90-105. 
100
 See An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, S.C. 1996, c. 1 (1996). 
101
 See Robert A. Young, “Jean Chretien’s Quebec Legacy: Coasting then Stickhandling Hard” (2004) 9 Rev. Const. 
Stud. 31 at 38-39. 
102
 Andrew Heard & Tim Swartz, ‘The Regional Veto Formula and its Effects on Canada’s Constitutional 
Amendment Process’ (1997) 30 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 339 at 342-43. 
103
 See David E. Smith, “The Canadian Senate: What is to be Done?” in Peter H. Russell, ed., Essential Readings in 
Canadian Constitutional Politics (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2011) at 43. 
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multilateral formal amendment proposed by Parliament before holding a ratifying vote in their 
provincial or territorial legislature.104 
 
In addition to the onerous escalating formal amendment rules as well as the 
constitutionally uncodified judicial and legislative requirements layered onto them, formal 
amendment in Canada may also be further complicated by constitutional convention. It has been 
suggested that the existing amendment thresholds do not reflect the new expectations of popular 
participation in constitutional amendment.105 The decision to require a national referendum to 
ratify the failed Charlottetown Accord may have created an expectation that future large-scale 
amendment efforts will also require one, making formal amendment even more difficult than its 
textual thresholds suggest.106 Another convention has arguably emerged from the same 
Charlottetown referendum: the territories’ involvement the 1992 referendal process may have 
created a precedent requiring their future participation.107 For all of these reasons, multilateral 
formal amendment on major constitutional issues in Canada is difficult, to say the least. 
III. SENATE REFORM AND THE SENATE REFERENCE 
 
The difficulty of formal amendment has made it unlikely to achieve Senate reform using 
the multilateral amendment procedures entrenched in the Constitution of Canada. It is also 
improbable to achieve meaningful Senate reform through the informal amendment process of 
judicial interpretation: the Court cannot, by interpretation, order elections for senator selection, 
nor can it impose a more equitable distribution of Senate seats, nor mandate more democratic 
measures in the Senate’s internal operation to make it more effective.108 In this way, the structure 
and design of the Senate are what Sanford Levinson would describe as “hard-wired” features of 
the Constitution that cannot be changed though the process of informal amendment.109  
 
Before the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canadian political actors updated the 
Constitution in the absence of formal amendment rules under a constitutional convention 
requiring provincial consent for significant constitutional changes.110 The Constitution Act, 1982 
finally entrenched formal amendment rules that more clearly authorized formal changes to the 
                                                 
104
 C.E.S. Franks, “A Continuing Canadian Conundrum: The Role of Parliament in Questions of National Unity and 
the Processes of Amending the Constitution” in J. Peter Meekison et al., eds., Reconsidering the Institution of 
Canadian Federalism (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004) 35 at 44. 
105
 I disagree with this conventional view because no such constitutional convention requiring referendal 
consultation has yet taken root. See Richard Albert, “The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” 
(currently under review). 
106
 See, e.g., Katherine Swinton, Amending the Canadian Constitution: Lessons from Meech Lake, 42 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 139, 167-68 (1992) (arguing that formal amendment should now incorporate greater citizen participation); R. 
Kent Weaver, “Political Institutions and Conflict Management in Canada” (1995) 538 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci 54 at 65.  
107
 See The 1992 Federal Referendum—A Challenge Met: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, at 58, 
January 17, 1994, online: http://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/1992/1992_Referendum_Part_2_E.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015) (cataloguing provincial, territorial and national participation rates in the 1992 referendum). 
108
 Modern proposals for Senate reform have generally called for a “Triple-E” Senate that is equal, elected and 
effective. See Ronald L. Watts, “Bicameralism in Federal Parliamentary Systems” in Serge Joyal, ed., Protecting 
Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew (Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2003) 67 at 96-100. 
109
 See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 29. 
110
 See Reference re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 904-05. 
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Senate,111 but political actors failed on two occasions to reform the Senate within larger 
frameworks of constitutional revision, first in the 1987 Meech Lake Accord112 and next in the 
1992 Charlottetown Accord.113 These two momentous failures of large-scale constitutional 
revision did not quell calls for Senate reform,114 certainly not from Western Canada, the origin of 
proposals for a Triple-E Senate.115 Indeed, all Canadians have long supported, and continue 
today to support, Senate reform.116 But in light of the recent failures of wholesale constitutional 
renewal, it is difficult to see a path to Senate reform by formal amendment, if even at all.117  
A. Modern Senate Reform 
 
The Conservative government’s modern proposals for Senate reform—the predicate for 
the Supreme Court’s Senate Reference—provide a contrast to the earlier, more comprehensive 
formal efforts to amend the Senate. As Bruce Hicks writes, whereas “substantive Senate reform 
has failed to get traction since Confederation,” the current approach toward Senate reform 
suggests a preference for “incremental changes that either do not require amending the 
Constitution Act, 1867 or do not require provincial consent.”118 In the Part to follow, I will argue 
that the modern proposals are just as significant as earlier efforts to reform the Senate, only that 
the framework for consultative elections advanced by the modern proposals—had the proposals 
been validated by the Supreme Court and subsequently entrenched into law—would have 
amended the Constitution of Canada informally, though with similarly far-reaching effect as the 
formal amendments envisioned by earlier large-scale attempts. First, however, it is important to 
understand precisely what the modern reforms proposed to do. 
 
The questions referred by the Conservative government ask the Supreme Court to 
evaluate Parliament’s power to pass three Senate reform bills.119 The Senate Term Limits bill, 
                                                 
111
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 See 1987 Constitutional Accord, Schedule to Constitutional Amendment, 1987, at Part 2, July 3, 1987. 
113
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 For a concise overview of Senate reform proposals, see Andre Barnes et al., Library of Parliament, “Reforming 
the Senate of Canada” (2011) Publication No. 2011-83-E at 7-12, online: 
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at 36, 39. 
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percent of Canadians support Senate reform and a total of seventy-eight percent support either reform or abolition). 
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introduced in 2006, proposes to formally amend Section 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by 
establishing an eight-year term limit for new senators.120 The Senate Appointments Consultation 
bill, introduced in 2007, proposes to create consultative provincial and territorial elections to 
gauge voter preferences to fill Senate vacancies as they arise in their province or territory.121 The 
Senate Reform bill, itself introduced in 2011, combines parts of the Senate Term Limits and 
Senate Appointments Consultations Elections bills into one: it establishes a nine-year term limit 
for new senators by formally amending Section 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867,122 and it 
moreover creates a framework for provincial and territorial elections to fill Senate vacancies.123 
In this Article, I focus only on the framework of advisory elections that the Conservative 
government proposed to create without a formal amendment. It is my claim that this framework 
for consultative senatorial elections would have informally amended the Constitution of Canada 
had the Court authorized Parliament to create this framework without a formal amendment. 
 
The Senate Reform and the Senate Appointments Consultation bills create a similar a 
framework for consultative senatorial elections. The purpose of both, stated in the former though 
not in the latter, is to constrain the prime minister to appoint senators who claim the popular 
support of voters in their province or territory. The Senate Reform bill’s primary governing 
principle holds that “senators to be appointed for a province or territory should be chosen from a 
list of Senate nominees submitted by the government of the province or territory,”124 with the list 
of nominees “to be determined by an election held in the province or territory.”125 The bill 
stipulates that where a province or territory has adopted the proposed electoral framework, which 
is set out in a schedule, the prime minister “must consider names from the most current list of 
Senate nominees selected for that province or territory” when “recommending Senate nominees 
to the Governor General.”126 The electoral framework contains instructions for administering 
consultative senatorial elections in a province or territory, including rules about candidate 
eligibility,127 election timing,128 election administration officials,129 nomination procedures,130 
balloting,131 concurrent provincial, territorial or municipal elections,132 as well as other 
                                                                                                                                                             
llNo=&rdoComingIntoForce=&DoSearch=Search+%2F+List&viewattach=27293&blnDisplayFlg=1 (last visited 
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regulations attendant to holding elections.133 The Senate Reform bill also establishes a nine-year 
term for senatorial appointees.134 Whereas this new term limit is identified as an express 
amendment to Section 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867,135 the new framework for consultative 
senatorial elections is not expressly identified as an amendment to the Constitution of Canada. 
This is a problematic omission, as I will show in Part IV. 
  
 The Senate Appointments Consultation bill has the same objective: to constrain the prime 
minister to consider provincial or territorial consultative senatorial election winners for 
appointment to the Senate. The bill’s framework for consultative elections adopts many of the 
same elements as the Senate Reform bill.136 The Senate Appointments Consultation bill states 
generally that the Government of Canada is “committed to pursuing comprehensive Senate 
reform to make the Senate an effective, independent and democratically elected body that 
equitably represents all regions.”137 Yet the bill appears to concede its own legal precariousness 
when it states that it seeks to alter the way the prime minister makes recommendations to the 
General Governor for eventual appointment “pending the pursuit of a constitutional amendment 
under subsection 38(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to provide for a means of direct election.”138 
Specifically, the bill creates “a method for ascertaining the preferences of electors in a province 
on appointments to the Senate within the existing process of summoning senators.”139 Although 
there may be a formal difference between establishing direct senatorial elections via Section 38 
and creating consultative senatorial elections as the bill intends to establish, there is little 
functional difference between the two types of selection mechanisms.140 The bill expressly 
identifies the long list of statutory amendments that would result from these major changes to 
senatorial selection but says nothing of the resulting constitutional amendments.141 As I will 
show in Part IV, this is a problem for the democratic legitimacy of the consultative senatorial 
elections the Conservative government sought to establish. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Senate Reference 
 
In the recent Senate Reference, the relevant question for the Supreme Court was “whether 
Parliament, acting alone, can reform the Senate by creating consultative elections to select 
senatorial nominees endorsed by the populations of the various provinces and territories… .”142 
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The Court rejected both major arguments from the Conservative government, namely first, that 
the introduction of consultative elections does not “constitute an amendment to the Constitution 
of Canada in relation to the method of selecting senators”143 and “in the alternative that, if the 
implementation of consultative elections requires a constitutional amendment, then it can be 
achieved under the unilateral federal amending procedure (s. 44).”144 The Court concluded that 
the Conservative government could not proceed as planned to establish its framework for 
provincial consultative elections to fill senatorial vacancies without violating of the Constitution 
of Canada. It is important to understand the Conservative government’s two major arguments. 
 
The Conservative government’s first major argument was that creating a framework for 
consultative senatorial elections does not constitute an amendment to the Constitution of 
Canada.145 It does not amend the Constitution because consultative elections may be introduced 
without changing the text of Constitution where the formal process for appointing individuals to 
the Senate—specifically by official summoning by the Governor General on the advice of the 
prime minister, as required by the Constitution Act, 1867146—remains unchanged.  
 
The Court advised the Conservative government that it could not accept this argument 
because it “privileges form over substance.”147 A constitutional amendment is more than a 
formal amendment to the constitutional text, and were the Court to accept the first major 
argument it would “reduce[] the notion of constitutional amendment to a matter of whether or 
not the letter of the constitutional text is modified.”148 Although introducing consultative 
elections would not change the constitutional text, “the Senate’s fundamental nature and role as a 
complementary legislative body of sober second thought would be significantly altered.”149 The 
Court made two basic points in this respect. First, relying on consultative elections to fill 
senatorial vacancies “would amend the Constitution of Canada by fundamentally altering its 
architecture.”150 The Senate would be transformed from an appointed body designed to bring 
moderation and deliberation to the legislative process, to an elected body that would lose its 
independence from the electoral process, introduce partisanship into its legislative role and 
thereby undermine its moderating and deliberative functions, and risk becoming an adversarial 
rather than complementary chamber to the House of Commons.151 
 
The Court also gave a textual reason why creating consultative elections would constitute 
a constitutional amendment. For the Court, the escalating structure of formal amendment leaves 
little room to doubt that the multilateral amendment procedure in Section 38 must be used to 
make constitutional amendments in connection with “the method of selecting senators,” to quote 
directly from the constitutional text.152 This generalist language on constitutional changes to 
senatorial selection “covers the implementation of consultative elections, indicating that a 
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constitutional amendment is required and making that amendment subject to the general 
procedure [in Section 38].”153 The Court again invoked the distinction between form and 
substance to support its interpretation of the Constitution: “the words ‘the method of selecting 
senators’ include more than the formal appointment of senators by the Governor General.”154 
The Constitution’s drafters chose this language in order to cover all alterations to the method of 
senatorial selection, not only for changes to the means of appointment.155 Therefore, explained 
the Court, the new framework of consultative elections, which would create candidate lists from 
which the prime minister would be expected to choose nominees for senatorial appointments, 
would effectively change the method of senatorial selection, and would therefore constitute an 
amendment requiring recourse to the multilateral amendment procedure in Section 38.156 
 
The Conservative government’s alternative argument conceded that creating consultative 
elections would constitute an amendment to the Constitution of Canada but insisted that such an 
amendment could be achieved using the unilateral federal amendment power under Section 
44.157 Subject to Sections 41 and 42 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Parliament is authorized under 
Section 44 to “exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the 
executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons.”158 The Conservative 
government therefore argued that introducing a framework of consultative elections would 
constitute an amendment to the Constitution of Canada “in relation to … the Senate” that is 
achievable through Parliament’s amendment authority in Section 44.159 
 
The Court likewise rejected this argument using a textualist interpretation of the 
Constitution. Since Parliament’s unilateral amending power is expressly made subject to Section 
42—which applies the multilateral amendment procedure under Section 38 to changes to “the 
method of selecting senators”—it follows for the Court that the Section 38 must be used to 
initiate consultative elections.160 Section 42 is peremptory in removing its designated items—for 
example, amendments to the Supreme Court of Canada, the principle of proportional 
representation in constituting the House of Commons and importantly to senatorial selection—
from the parliamentary power under Section 44.161 To read the interrelation of Sections 38, 42 
and 44 otherwise would be to misread the limited scope of Section 44 and to confer upon 
Parliament the unilateral power to fundamentally change the Constitution of Canada without the 
required measure of provincial consent contemplated by the escalating structure of formal 
amendment.162 Therefore, wrote the Court, Parliament cannot lawfully introduce consultative 
elections and thereby amend the Constitution of Canada using the narrow power of Section 44.163 
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C. Democratic Values and Consultative Elections 
 
It is difficult to find error in the Supreme Court’s careful rejection of the Conservative 
government’s proposed Senate reforms. As an exposition of legal doctrine, it is consistent with 
the standard set by the Court’s best precedents in defining constitutional law. As an act of 
judicial statecraft, it achieves two important objectives: it sets the rules for Senate reform in 
Canadian constitutional politics and confirms the Court as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional 
meaning. But as an exercise in constitutional statesmanship, the strongest critique of the Court’s 
advisory opinion is precisely that it is carefully measured, perhaps too much so. The Court failed 
to expose the extent to which the proposed introduction of consultative senatorial elections—not 
the consultative elections themselves, but the way the Conservative government proposed to 
introduce them into Canadian political practice—violates not only the Constitution but also the 
democratic values of transparency, accountability and predictability in the rule of law. 
 
The Court made no mention of the democratic deficiencies in the Conservative 
government’s plans to institute consultative senatorial elections. It did, however, suggest that 
consultative elections might create a constitutional convention on senatorial selection and 
nomination. The Court suggested that requiring the prime minister to consider the individuals 
identified on the lists of elected candidates for appointment to the Senate would tie the prime 
minister’s hands in senatorial selection.164 Acknowledging that “it is true that, in theory, prime 
ministers could ignore the election results and rarely, or indeed never, recommend to the 
Governor General the winners of consultative elections,”165 the Court reasoned correctly that 
“we cannot assume that future prime ministers will defeat [the purpose of giving senators a 
popular mandate] by ignoring the results of costly and hard-fought consultative elections.”166 But 
the Court could have said more to lay bare the problematic irregularity of the procedures by 
which Conservative government sought to introduce consultative senatorial elections. 
 
Others have suggested similar critiques of the proposal for consultative senatorial 
elections. For example, the Canadian Bar Association has opposed consultative elections because 
although they would “not affect the legal authority of the Prime Minister to select nominees to be 
appointed to the Senate,” they would “affect his or her practical ability to select such 
nominees.”167 The Association explains that the prime minister’s practical authority would be 
constrained as he or she began to draw nominees from lists of elected candidates because it 
would become difficult “to choose any candidate other than those preferred by the consultation 
vote.”168 The prime minister would understandably “be reluctant to ignore the direct expression 
of the electors,” and thus “it is conceivable that the conditions for the creation of a convention 
may arise over time such that a Prime Minister would always respect the electorate’s choice.”169  
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 Scholars have made related, though different, critiques. Fabien Gélinas and Léonid 
Sirota, for instance, have argued that consultative senatorial elections would increase the political 
authority of the Senate contrary to its original design.170 This could eventually overrun the 
convention limiting the Senate’s power to oppose the will of the House of Commons, with 
consequences for responsible government, Cabinet formation, Canada’s constitutional monarchy 
and more generally the Constitution of Canada.171 José Woehrling has suggested that it would be 
preferable to reform senatorial selection through the establishment of a constitutional convention 
pursuant to which the federal executive would select senatorial nominees on the recommendation 
of provincial executives.172 For his part, Gary O’Brien, the former Deputy Clerk of the Senate, 
has cautioned that consultative elections could upset current committee operations in the Senate, 
and would in turn change the nature and function of the Senate.173 
 
These are strong criticisms of the Conservative government’s Senate reform proposals 
but none addresses squarely the core of the democratic deficiency in consultative senatorial 
elections. Consultative elections are not problematic in and of themselves. On the contrary, they 
reflect a potentially positive step toward demystifying the Senate. However their proposed 
introduction through irregular means is democratically deficient in important ways that threaten 
to weaken the rule of law in Canada. This is perhaps a paradoxical argument—after all, how 
could an indirectly elected Senate weaken the rule of law or reveal democratic deficiencies?—
but it is worth making in defense of transparency, accountability and predictability. The process 
by which the Conservative government proposed to introduce consultative senatorial elections 
would have undermined democratic values, notwithstanding the democracy-enhancing result of 
consultative elections replacing the existing practice of non-democratic senatorial appointment 
with a more democratic method of electoral consultation. In the Part to follow, I turn my 
attention to the democratic deficiency in the Conservative government’s proposal for 
consultative senatorial elections. 
IV. STEALTH AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Constitutional amendment ordinarily channels public deliberation through formal, 
transparent and predictable procedures designed to express the informed aggregated choices of 
political actors. The Conservative government’s plan to create consultative senatorial elections 
amounted to a proposal for a major constitutional amendment to the basic structure of the 
Constitution of Canada yet it was designed to occur outside of this conventional process of 
constitutional amendment. The Conservative government deployed a strategy of stealth 
amendment through informal and irregular procedures in order to circumvent the onerous but 
nonetheless constitutionally required rules for amending senatorial selection. Constitutional 
amendment by stealth is a species of informal amendment. It has three distinguishing features: 
first, it is an effort to circumvent the rules of formal amendment; second, its underlying intent is 
to create a practice that will ultimately bind successors to a constitutional convention; and third, 
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the substance of the convention itself is democracy-promoting but its origins are democracy-
deficient insofar as they circumvent the constitution’s formal amendment rules.  
 
In this Part, I explain the concept of constitutional amendment by stealth and illustrate 
how the Conservative government’s proposed senator selection reforms reflect this method of 
informal and irregular constitutional change. I also explore the costs and consequences of stealth 
amendment. My ultimate claim is that the stealth senatorial selection amendment attempted by 
the Conservative government violates the democratic rule of law values of transparency, 
predictability and accountability. Let me stress, at the outset, that much of this analysis is a 
modest effort to project into the future what would have happened had the Conservative 
government passed its framework for consultative senatorial elections into law. The point is to 
explore the implications for constitutional law and politics of consultative senatorial elections. 
A. Consultative Elections and the Creation of Convention 
 
 The best critique of the Conservative government’s Senate reform efforts concerns what 
Mark Walters calls the strategy “to exploit the distinction between constitutional law and 
constitutional convention, and to legislate for an elected Senate within the realm of convention 
while leaving the appointed Senate in tact as a matter of law.”174 Walters suggests that the 
consultative elections law, if passed and sanctioned by the Court, would have ultimately 
compelled the provinces to opt-in to the system of provincial consultative senatorial elections.175 
The source of compulsion, however, would not necessarily be a convention, explains Walters, 
but would rather stem from political necessity.  
 
1. The Constraint of Consultative Elections 
 
 To understand Walters’ sophisticated argument, it is important to accept his point of 
departure, namely that there is a distinction between feeling “obliged” to do something  and 
feeling “obligated” to do that thing.176 The creation of a constitutional convention, writes 
Walters, turns on the “special sense of obligation” that binds political actors to feel “obligated to 
do” something, a feeling that is “necessary for there to be a rule” without which “no true 
constitutional convention could be said to exist.”177 In the absence of such an obligation, the 
consultative elections law would not create a proper rule but rather simply a practice. Walters 
even doubts whether “a true convention on appointing elected senators could emerge”178 in the 
future. He concludes that “the real point of the legislation, then, is to make it politically difficult, 
perhaps even impossible, for future prime ministers to depart from this practice.”179 It would 
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become politically unpalatable for the prime minister to refuse to nominate the victorious 
candidates because the duty to consider the consultative senatorial elections would leave the 
prime minister with no choice but to nominate the candidate chosen by voters. Walters illustrates 
the unavoidable constraint that the political reality of consultative elections would bring to bear: 
 
Confronted with the statutory duty to “consider” elections results, a future Prime 
Minister who disagreed with, and wanted to depart from, Harper’s practice of 
appointing elected senators to an otherwise unreformed Senate would either have 
to “consider” the election results and reject them, appointing something the 
people did not select in place of the people they did select, or take steps to have 
the legislation repealed, thus appearing to  take away from the people a right to 
vote for their legislators, and it is fair to assume that selecting either course of 
action would involve political costs that the departure from a mere practice 
unsupported by legislation would not. 
 
This is problematic, writes Walters, because consultative elections appear to “establish[] the 
basis for a constitutional trap not a constitutional convention.”180 In the short-term, the Senate 
would in practice, though not by convention, become elected but it would remain unreformed 
both in terms of its seat distribution and its constitutional powers and functions.181 In the long-
term, however, the Conservative government would seek first to formalize this practice with a 
formal amendment to constitutionalize an elected Senate, which by then will have become an 
unchangeable political reality,182 and second to force the provinces to negotiate the other aspects 
of Senate reform with constrained choices on reform possibilities since an elected Senate will 
have become a “foregone conclusion.”183 Walters stresses this idea of compulsion, or force as he 
emphasizes, in lamenting that the Conservative government’s introduction of consultative 
elections would have rigged the rules of future constitutional change: “Once the step toward an 
elected Senate is taken, the basic course of future reform will have been established and the 
choices available to actors involved in subsequent steps will have been forced in ways that they 
would not otherwise be.”184 Walters is justifiably concerned about consultative elections. 
 
 But even Walters’ strong critique of consultative elections is incomplete. Walters is 
correct that consultative elections would set a “trap” for the provinces in future negotiations on 
constitutional reform but it is important to identify the actors, objects and subjects of the 
entrapment more clearly than he does. Second, I depart from Walters on whether the introduction 
of consultative elections as proposed by the Conservative government would ultimately create a 
constitutional convention binding upon future prime ministers. Walters argues no, but there is a 
much stronger case to be made than Walters suggests. Third, as I will discuss in the Section to 
follow,185 had the Supreme Court approved the Conservative government’s proposal for 
consultative elections, the outcome would have been harmful to democracy and the rule of law in 
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Canada—a paradoxical point, to be sure, given that consultative elections would have given 
Canadians the power to vote for their heretofore-appointed senators. 
 
2. The Actors, Objects and Subjects of Entrapment 
 
 Walters is not specific enough about the effect of consultative elections on the provinces, 
nor does he explain how much further than the provinces themselves the effect would extend. 
First, it is undeniable that consultative elections would limit the range of choices available to 
provincial premiers, provincial legislatures, and also of the provincial electorate in future 
constitutional reform. The prime ministerial practice of nominating winning consultative election 
candidates would become politically irreversible despite possible opposition from provincial 
premiers, who would risk losing their status as the province’s voice in Ottawa in favour of 
elected senators sent by voters to Ottawa for that purpose. Provincial legislatures, for their part, 
would have a difficult time justifying any opposition to proposals to formalize an elected Senate 
given that consultative elections would have effectively led to a de facto elected Senate. And, for 
the same reason, the provincial electorate would not accept anything less than an elected Senate 
in formal constitutional negotiations. The negotiations on any future formal amendment would 
therefore be distorted by the informal transformation of the Senate into a de facto elected body. 
 
 But the effect of consultative elections would extend beyond the provinces themselves. 
The prime ministerial practice would bind future prime ministers to follow his example, which as 
I will argue below would eventually mature into a convention.186 It would deny other political 
actors, including the parliamentary opposition, provincial premiers and legislatures, as well as 
the Canadian electorate, the constitutional right to deliberate on whether Canada should have an 
elected Senate—a right that is in any case virtually meaningless without the concurrent authority 
simultaneously to make substantive changes to the powers and functions of the Senate. The 
subjects of the Conservative government’s entrapment would therefore be the entire universe of 
Canadian political actors. When the time would have arrived to constitutionalize senatorial 
elections and to make related Senate reforms, Canada’s federalist safeguards to major 
constitutional change would be just one of many constitutional rules obviated by the 
Conservative government’s by-then normalized practice of consultative senatorial elections. 
 
There is an additional point worth making: the purpose of the Conservative government’s 
entrapment was unconstitutional at best and illegitimate at worst. The Conservative government 
sought to do unilaterally what it could not do multilaterally. As I will explain in detail below, any 
future constitutional change to the Senate and to the Constitution of Canada would have followed 
from the framework of consultative elections adopted by Parliament alone with no further 
national consultation, and it would have been operationalized exclusively by the prime minister 
in his choice of whom to nominate to the Senate. One person would therefore have had a 
disproportionate influence on the reform of the Senate, contrary both to the actual design of the 
Constitution, which mandates multilateral agreement for a constitutional change of such 
significance, and to the spirit of Constitution, whose architecture is intended to foster cooperative 
federalism, not executive constitutionalism, in major constitutional change. 
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What made the plan for senatorial elections devious is what made it brilliant: the 
Conservative government sought to “trap,” to repeat the term used by Walters, provincial actors 
into no other alternative but to ratify by future constitutional amendment the framework for an 
elected Senate created by consultative elections—whether or not the provinces indeed supported 
the idea on its merit. The trap would have been inescapable: either formally entrench 
consultative elections or deny the provincial electorate the de facto right to elect its own senators, 
a right that voters would have deemed vested in light of their continuing practice of electing their 
senators. But there is a stronger case than Walters suggests that consultative elections as 
proposed by the Conservative government would have created a constitutional convention 
binding future prime ministers, though binding only politically not legally.  
 
3. The Convention on Senator Selection 
 
 A convention, which is an obligation to act “in a way other than what the formal law 
prescribes or allows,”187 can arise from practice, agreement, declaration or principle.188 Had the 
Court approved consultative elections, the origin of the convention requiring the prime minister 
to nominate the consultative election winners could not have been traced to either practice or 
principle alone. Moreover, the lack of public agreement ex-ante or ex-post to the convention, as 
well as the absence of any authoritative declaration that a convention was being established, 
would have been problematic, as I explain below. The meaning of a convention and its formation 
are key to understanding why consultative elections as proposed by the Conservative government 
would have ultimately created a convention requiring future prime ministers to conform their 
conduct to the precedent of nominating the winning consultative election winner to the Senate.  
 
The study of conventions must begin with Ivor Jennings’ three-part test for their 
creation.189 Jennings wrote that “we have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what are the 
precedents; second, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and 
thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?”190 This test requires precedents for establishing a 
convention, political actors to feel bound by those precedents, and a normative reason for the 
rule supported by conventional practice. As to the first question, Jennings explained that “mere 
practice is insufficient.”191 As to the second and third, just because political actors do act a 
certain way does not mean that they should; they must “believe that they ought to do so” in order 
for a convention to exist.192 The creation of a convention must also “be due to the reason of the 
thing because it accords with the prevailing political philosophy,” meaning that it “helps to make 
the democratic system operate” or that “it enables the machinery of State to run more smoothly.” 
And where the convention continues to operate “because it is desirable in the circumstances of 
the constitution, it must be created for the same reason.”193 These then are the three conditions 
for the creation of a convention: precedent, self-consciousness and normativity. 
 
                                                 
187
 Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law & Politics (Don Mills, Ontario: 
Oxford UniversityPress, 2d ed. 2013) at 5. 
188
 Ibid. at 6-11. 
189
 Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London, UK: University of London Press, 5th ed. 1959) at 136. 
190
 Ibid. 
191
 Ibid. at 134. 
192
 Ibid. at 135. 
193
 Ibid. at 136. 
RICHARD ALBERT                 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2015)                    STEALTH AMENDMENT 
 
26 | P a g e  
 
 A convention may arise separately in four ways. It may arise as a result of a political 
practice seen as “necessary to protect some facet of the constitutional system,”194 by agreement 
where “the main political actors” expressly create or alter a “sort of contractual agreement” to act 
in a certain way,195 from the intent to establishment one “by authoritative unilateral declarations 
by key political actors,”196 and from principle where “a substantive obligation” exists “requiring 
political actors to behave in a certain way.”197 In light of the historically harsh critique of the 
Senate for its democratic deficit as an appointed chamber,198 the Senate would have accrued a 
new democratic legitimacy as an elected body under the plan for consultative elections, and this 
would have been difficult for prime ministers to ignore. Refusing to nominate a senatorial 
election winner would have invited the disapproval of voters who would have seen the previous 
prime minister accede to their democratically expressed wishes to choose their senators. The 
continued prime ministerial nomination of election winners would have become a de facto moral 
obligation to respect the democratization of the Senate set in motion by the elections themselves.  
 
Assume the Court had reached the opposite conclusion in the Senate Reference: that the 
Conservative government has the constitutional authority to create a framework for senatorial 
elections using Section 44. Under the majority Conservative government, the bill would have 
passed in both houses, it would have received royal assent, and it would have come into force 
relatively soon, let us say no later than the end of 2014. With 18 Senate vacancies across seven 
provinces,199 it is not unreasonable to posit that there would have been pressure on both federal 
and provincial political actors to fill them.200 At least some and perhaps all of these provincial 
consultative senatorial elections would have been held prior to the federal general election, 
scheduled for October 2015, and the current prime minister, exercising his personal prerogative 
to choose whom to appoint,201 would have nominated the winning candidates, who would in turn 
have been summoned to the chamber by the Governor General as the Constitution requires.202  
 
Whether or not the incumbent prime minister had won reelection in the general election, 
this practice of prime ministerial nomination of consultative election winners is likely to have 
continued. It would have either persisted under the reelected prime minister, or under a new 
prime minister from the incumbent party or, perhaps grudgingly, under a new prime minister 
from the previous opposition. Under the law authorizing provinces to hold elections to choose 
their Senate representatives, those elections would have yielded clear indications of voter 
preferences for Senate nominees in their province. The current prime minister, if reelected, 
would have continued the practice, as it had been his declared preference. A different prime 
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minister would only at his or her peril have cast aside the clearly expressed wishes of voters, 
even if the province had not been one that tended to support his or her party. Failure to heed the 
choice of provincial voters would have given the opposition ammunition to deride the prime 
minister and it would have moreover caused members of his or her own party to question the 
commitment to reforming the Senate, and more broadly to democratizing public institutions in 
need of change. It is of course possible that a new prime minister would have resisted the 
practice begun by his predecessor to nominate winning candidates to the Senate. But the new 
prime minister would still have had to contend with provincial leaders and voters who would 
have come to expect, from earlier nominations, the right to continue choosing their senators. 
 
 The expectation of the right of choice created by prior practice would moot inquiries into 
whether the right had been properly created. The regularity of the practice would cause politics 
to override law, transforming a practice into a conventional right over time as political actors 
continued to engage in it. Political pressure to conform to prior practice would change the rule of 
recognition to recognize the validity of the expectation that prime ministers will nominate the 
winning consultative election candidates to the Senate. In Hartian terms, prime ministerial 
practice of nominating the consultative election winner to the Senate would become “a rule of 
the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.”203 That a convention arises in this way 
does not undermine the force or legitimacy of the convention, as long as political actors self-
consciously act in a way reflecting their “shared acceptance”204 of the practice as a “guiding 
rule”205 for their conduct. Conventions, after all, “ultimately reflect what people do,”206 and they 
are the result of political actors internalizing a rule as obligatory. 
 
What makes it even harder to imagine that the governing party could discontinue this 
practice of prime ministerial nomination of consultative senatorial election winners is that the 
practice is supported by the principle of democracy. This speaks to the normativity that Jennings 
insists must underpin a political practice before it becomes a convention. Although the process 
by which the convention had been established would have belied the formal rules for changing 
the method of senatorial selection, it would have become cloaked in a nearly-unassailable 
democratic legitimacy that can be conferred only by free electoral choice. The newly-
democratized Senate would have become untouchable, “an area in which the freedom of the 
actors on the governmental stage is curtailed (though not by legal restraints)” and in which those 
actors “are precluded from adopting the policy that accords with their perception of what the 
public interest requires.”207 Here, the democratic principle justifying senatorial elections would 
have frustrated any inclination that opponents might have had to deny voters the acquired right to 
choose their senators. It is in this way that the practice would have become a convention: after a 
critical number of exercises, “any deviation from the practice attracts—and is rightly regarded as 
attracting—criticism and pressure to conform.”208 There would henceforth have been no 
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reasonable political basis for abolishing senatorial elections, although the legal case would be 
strong in light of its constitutionally illegitimate origins, as I discuss further below.209 
 
It is important to stress that the practice would not have matured into a constitutional 
convention without the compliance of opposition parties. Cross-party ratification, either by 
affirmative approval or grudging acquiescence, is a condition of the creation of a convention. 
The real essence of a convention, Joseph Jaconelli explains, “is to be found in the system of 
concordant actions and expectations that draws into its compass even those who were not parties 
to the agreement.”210 The test for Jenning’s second of three questions—whether the actors in the 
precedents believe they were bound by a rule—can be answered definitely only where the 
opposition, when it attains power, conforms its conduct to a practice established by its 
predecessor.211 As I have suggested above, it would be politically unpalatable for opponents to 
discontinue the practice of prime ministerial nomination of winning consultative election 
candidates. The self-conscious ratification of the practice by the former opposition would 
validate the practice by mutuality of approval—a practice whose continued observance across 
parties would ultimately transform it into a convention legitimated by cross-party precedent.  
 
Though it would have arisen by practice and principle, the convention of prime 
ministerial nomination of winning consultative senatorial election candidates would have lacked 
agreement and declarative transparency. It would have lacked the former because we know that 
the Conservative government’s proposed framework of consultative elections is opposed by the 
opposition and across many provinces.212 It would moreover have lacked declarative 
transparency because the prime minister did not at the time of its tabling in the House, nor has he 
since, spoken of the introduction of consultative senatorial elections as a way to create a 
convention that will bind his successors in whom to nominate to the Senate. On the contrary, the 
Conservative government argued before the Supreme Court in the Senate Reference that future 
prime ministers would retain their discretion to choose whom to nominate to the Senate and 
would not be compelled to nominate the consultative election winner.213 The absence of 
agreement and declarative transparency highlights the irregularity of this convention, though it 
does not in the end undermine its binding quality upon political actors. That the convention 
would be binding as a political matter but lacking in legal basis raises a question in need of an 
different answer: how, precisely, would this new convention be constitutionally deficient? 
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B. Stealth Amendment and the Values of Formal Amendment 
 
It is reasonable for Walters to predict that the introduction of consultative elections could 
in the long-term rig the rules of constitutional change so as to limit the range of reform options 
available to political actors. After years of unbroken precedents of prime ministers nominating 
for senatorial appointment the winners in province-level consultative elections, future prime 
ministers would become expected to honor the practice, which, as I have argued above in 
contrast to Walters,214 will have matured into a constitutional convention. The origin of this 
convention would be traced to political necessity but the convention itself, which Walters regards 
as a practice, would in short course reflect an intrinsic democratic value.  
  
The consequence of introducing consultative elections is even more problematic than 
Walters perceives. Consultative elections could admittedly tie the hands of political actors in 
future constitutional reforms but that is only one adverse consequence of consultative elections. 
The more important one is that the consultative elections proposed by the Conservative 
government would have undermined the rule of law. Consultative elections themselves are not 
the problem; it is rather the way the Conservative government sought to introduce them. By 
pursuing its reform efforts in defiance of the textually required formal amendment rules for 
altering the method of senatorial selection, the Conservative government attempted to 
circumvent the Constitution’s public, transparent and predictable procedures for making changes 
to its basic structure. Had the Conservative government succeeded in creating its new framework 
for consultative elections, it would have been a constitutional amendment by stealth. 
 
Constitutional amendment by stealth is an innovative but illegitimate method of 
constitutional change. It occurs where political actors consciously establish a new political 
practice whose repetition is intended to create an expectation that successors will have to comply 
with that practice as it matures into a constitutional convention. Constitutional amendment by 
stealth is driven by the political reality that formally amending the constitution is difficult if not 
improbable. In light of the near or actual impossibility of formal amendment, political actors 
choose to ignore the formal rules of the constitution and instead to pursue their reform objectives 
through informal and irregular procedures, all with the intent of submitting their successors into 
compliance. Constitutional amendment by stealth therefore deliberately evades the public, 
transparent and predictable formal amendment procedures that are designed precisely to express 
the informed aggregated choices of multiple political actors rather than the preferences of a few. 
 
1. The Values of the Rule of Law 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s conception of the rule of law places primacy on the 
constitutional text. As the Court has held, the rule of law “requires that courts give effect to the 
Constitution’s text, and apply, by whatever its terms, legislation that conforms to that text.”215 
This positivist interpretation of the rule of law is not entirely procedural. The Court has 
recognized that the rule of law embraces three principles: the supremacy of law over both public 
and private actors; the legal regulation of interactions between public and private actors; and the 
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establishment and maintenance of positive laws that reflect an order of normative values.216 
Importantly, however, the Court has stressed that although law must be sustained by normative 
values, any discovered principles should cohere with the text, not undermine it, because “the rule 
of law is not an invitation to trivialize or supplant the Constitution’s written terms.”217  
 
Constitutional amendment by stealth violates the democratic values of the rule of law. It 
does not satisfy the rule of law’s expectations of transparency, accountability and predictability. 
In the most influential scholarly articulations of the rule of law, Lon Fuller, A.V. Dicey and 
Friedrich Hayek each separately stress the discretion-limiting quality of the rule of law and its 
cornerstone feature of consistency between the law as written and as applied. For Fuller, the rule 
of law requires a legal system to respect at minimum eight criteria, four of which appear to be 
infringed in a material way by stealth amendment. First, the rule of law rejects lawmaking 
created “on an ad hoc basis.”218 Law must instead spring from formal procedures allowing 
opportunities for open and meaningful deliberation about its implications. Second, the rule of 
law rejects the “failure to publicize” the laws relied upon by political actors.219 When the law is 
not known, it cannot be properly followed, understood or challenged as to its constitutionality. 
Third, the rule of law rejects the “failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their 
actual administration.”220 The rules on the books should as much as practicable match the rules 
in practice, otherwise their discordance leads to confusion and the possibility of arbitrary state 
conduct.221 Fourth, the rule of law places a responsibility on political actors: to make the law 
understandable to those subject to them, and to make known the laws that apply to the 
governors.222 The law should be clear so that those subject to it may comply with it. 
 
Dicey and Hayek’s own renderings of the rule of law also suggest that stealth amendment 
is problematic. Dicey writes that “the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government 
based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of 
constraint”223 Hayek echoes the same theme in defining the rule of law: “Stripped of all 
technicalities, [the rule of law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed 
and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs 
of the basis of this knowledge.”224 The rule of law requires official conduct to conform to 
standards established in advance of the actions taken, and it authorizes citizens both to scrutinize 
that official conduct and to pass judgment upon it.225 
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In contrast to the rule of law’s expectation of limited discretion, the power of stealth 
amendment expands the discretionary authority of political actors. The exercise of discretion is 
of course not on its own problematic for the rule of law in constitutional democracies. Indeed, 
discretion is necessary feature of liberal democratic governance, particularly in light of the rise 
of the administrative state.226 But the difference here is that stealth amendment combines the 
exercise of discretion with informality and irregularity, and together they undermine the values 
of transparency, accountability and predictability—three fundamental values that we associate 
with the rule of law and which double as operating principles for good government.  
 
In his analysis of the democratic foundations for the rule of law, Joseph Raz highlighted 
these three values.227 The rule of law, he wrote, requires transparency: the law should be “open 
and adequately publicized” because people “must be able to find out what it is.”228 Laws and 
their meaning must therefore be clear: “An ambiguous, vague, or imprecise law is likely to 
mislead or confuse at least some of those who desire to be guided by it.”229 The rule of law also 
requires predictabilty: laws “should be relatively stable” and “should not be changed too 
often.”230 If the law changes often, Raz cautioned, “people will find it difficult to find out what 
the law is at any given moment and will be constantly in fear that the law has been changed since 
they last learnt what it was.”231 More broadly, the rule of law demands predictability because 
“people need to know the law not only for short-term decisions … but also for long-term 
planning,”232 and they need to be confident in “their knowledge of the content of the law.”233 The 
rule of law also demands accountability for political actors and the decisions they make in their 
official capacity. Law should be general, open and stable, and should in turn be subject to laws 
that are themselves general, open and stable. The value of accountability in the rule of law 
therefore derives from the expectation that lawmaking itself must be “be guided by open, stable, 
clear, and general rules.”234 This in turn puts political actors on notice that citizens must be given 
the capacity to monitor their conduct. 
 
At bottom, then, the rule of law holds that “political power may not be exercised except 
according to procedures and constraints prescribed by laws which are publicly known.”235 It 
“requires all persons, including governmental officials, to obey the laws and be held accountable 
if they do not”236 and insists that “the laws can be changed only through constitutional 
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procedures and may not be nullified or overridden by individual fiat.”237 In this way, the rule of 
law binds political actors to clearly-disseminated principles and procedures that are transparently 
revisable. In contrast, the informality, irregularity and circumvention of stealth amendment is 
inconsistent with these rule of law values of transparency, predictability and accountability. 
 
These are procedural values, but they appeal to us for more than their procedural 
protections. We value them also for how they shape interactions between public institutions and 
private individuals, protecting the latter from the former.238 According to Jeremy Waldron, we 
“radically sell short the idea of the Rule of Law” where we do not recognize the importance of 
procedure.239 Conforming lawmaking to norms of generality, publicity, prospectivity, stability 
and clarity helps guard against violations of the substantive values that we associate with liberal 
democracy, namely dignity and liberty.240 Political actors should accordingly be sanctioned for 
violating the rule of law “when the norms that are applied by officials do not correspond to the 
norms that have been made public to the citizens or when officials act on the basis of their own 
discretion rather than according to norms laid down in advance.”241 Here, again, we see the 
importance to the rule of law of the procedural values of transparency, accountability and 
predictability—values reflected in procedures that serve substantive democratic purposes. 
 
2. Formal Amendment and the Rule of Law 
 
Formal amendment procedures serve these three rule of law values.242 Formal 
amendment telegraphs when and how constitutional change occurs, and it produces legislatively 
or popularly agreed-upon changes that are ultimately inscribed in the constitutional text for all to 
read and to internalize. Pursuing constitutional change via formal amendment performs an 
educative function in society, both for political actors and for the people, and the textual 
memorialization of the change satisfies Fuller’s four criteria noted above for respecting the rule 
of law: it is a formalized process, it reflects congruence between law and practice, it serves the 
interest of clarity, and it results in public dissemination.243 This fourth criterion, publicity, is an 
important but largely underappreciated function of formal amendment, but in it we find the core 
of the reason why respecting formal amendment procedures is central to the rule of law: “This 
textual referent, being available and apparent, enables more people to understand the fact that 
there has been constitutional change and to take note of it than if the change comes informally … 
.”
244
 Formal amendment and its textual entrenchment is structured, visible and overt, not ad hoc 
and unseeable, the latter being features of constitutional amendment by stealth. 
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Formal amendment rules are a corrective vehicle authorizing political actors to alter the 
constitutional text in a public, knowable and comprehensible process. Their public procedures 
invite civic engagement when they are invoked, their textual entrenchment makes them 
knowable and accessible, and their precise requirements are generally accessible enough so as to 
allow political actors and the people to understand the standard they set for constitutional 
changes. Formal amendment rules consequently promote predictability “by assuring that any 
constitutional modifications are predictable, orderly, strictly regulated, and highly supported.”245 
They help foster stability by making it difficult to alter entrenched commitments, which in turn 
can moderate the pace of constitutional change.246 They also serve transparency, insofar as 
formal amendment is associated with constancy and clarity.247  
 
Constitutional amendment by stealth cannot serve any of these three rule of law values. It 
fails the tests of predictability, transparency and accountability because its procedures are not 
knowable, at least initially, by anyone other than the political actors who choose to pursue it. 
This complicates the task of holding political actors accountable. Where the informal procedures 
of a stealth amendment are unknowable, it becomes unlikely that the political actors pursuing the 
change can or eventually will be held accountable for their non-public decisions before it 
becomes too late, that is, before the political practice has matured into a convention.  
 
Formal and stealth amendment differ in three other ways. First, whereas formal 
amendment requires a new constitutional rule to survive the labyrinthine but detailed steps of 
approval and ratification, and if successful it culminates in a new rule that has been legitimated 
by the rigours of entrenched amendment procedures, the informal process of constitutional 
amendment by stealth threatens to devalue the words of the constitutional text.248 As Brannon 
Denning cautions, “the reliance on informal change can produce a constitutional culture in which 
people feel less and less bound by the words of the document which supposedly govern them.”249 
Second, in contrast to formal amendment, which requires the participation of a range of political, 
popular and institutional actors, stealth amendment excludes opposing political actors and the 
people from the otherwise deliberative process of constitutional amendment and thus divests 
both the process and the product of its democratic legitimacy. This is especially problematic 
where the stealth amendment targets a fundamental feature of the constitutional regime, as is the 
case here with respect to the Senate. Finally, stealth amendment denies opposing political actors 
and the people the right to engage in an open debate about constitutional issues of national 
importance.250 This is problematic in a constitutional democracy because the right to engage in 
the formal process of constitutional amendment is above all a right to exercise democracy.251 
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Yet one can resist stealth amendment without rejecting all informal constitutional change. 
There are advantages to pursuing and authorizing constitutional change outside the strictures of 
formal amendment rules. For one, the instability and relative impermanence of informal 
amendment can be recast as a virtue: it authorizes political actors to adapt the constitution to 
changing times and exigencies without the risk of formal amendment failure.252 In addition, the 
unwritten informal amendment process fosters dialogic interactions among political, popular and 
institutional actors, and these kinds of interactions are socially constructive.253 An additional 
benefit involves constitutional contestation: the difficulty of both identifying and defining the 
content of informal amendment promotes the continuing contestability of constitutional law.254 
Contestability in this respect is arguably valuable because it has the potential to enhance civic 
participation in elaborating constitutional meaning,255 and it might moreover promote judicial 
minimalism, to the extent this is a desirable judicial posture.256 Informal amendment can 
therefore entail important benefits. But constitutional amendment by stealth offers none of them 
because it is a calculated non-public circumvention of the rules of democratic constitutionalism.  
 
3. Consultative Elections and the Rule of Law 
 
Here, the Conservative government’s recourse to Section 44 to amend senator selection 
by stealth was driven by the difficulty of formal amendment and its intent to do informally what 
is impossible formally. The prime minister’s historic appearance before the Special Senate 
Committee on Senate Reform—the first time the sitting head of government appeared before a 
Senate committee—underlined his commitment to Senate reform, but also revealed his strategic 
calculation to proceed by informal rather than formal amendment. His testimony made clear that 
his objective was eventually to “have an election process where we can consult the population 
rather than to appoint senators traditionally.”257 Such a reversal from tradition should not, 
however, occur through the normal legislative channels he ultimately chose for initiating Senate 
reform. It should instead occur only through the formal procedures required by the Constitution.  
 
In September 2006, the prime minister appeared before the Senate to discuss his 
government’s bill on Senate term limits. But he also addressed consultative senatorial elections. 
The prime minister began his testimony by lamenting the repeated failures of Senate reform in 
Canadian history. As the newly-elected prime minister, he suggested that the same thing would 
not happen under his leadership: “the government is not looking for another report but is seeking 
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action,”258 he said, insisting that he had made a campaign pledge to reform the Senate and that he 
had “come here today to reiterate personally my commitment to reform this institution.”259  
 
 He then explained that the bill on Senate term limits was part of a larger plan to proceed 
incrementally to reform the Senate. After term limits, the government would create Senate 
elections: “As yet another step in fulfilling our commitment to make the Senate more effective 
and more democratic, the government, hopefully this fall, will introduce a bill in the House to 
create a process to choose elected senators.”260 That bill, the prime minister emphasized, would 
“further demonstrate how seriously the government takes the issue of serious Senate reform.”261 
The prime minister saw an elected Senate as important because it would democratize the body, 
assuage long-standing misgivings from western Canada, and it would also bring Canada in line 
with modern constitutional democracies, which “virtually all now elect their legislatures.”262 
 
 In his exchanges with senators on the committee, the prime minister’s plan became clear. 
He had chosen to pursue incremental change—Senate term limits first, then consultative 
elections on their own—because piecemeal change allowed Parliament to act unilaterally 
“without engaging other levels of government in a complex constitutional discussion or 
amendment process.”263 The prime minister acknowledged that he could have attempted these 
changes all at once by launching a process of “comprehensive reform through, in a sense, mega 
constitutional negotiations.”264 But he concluded that “my observations over the last 20 years of 
federal-provincial politics … are such that I do not see comprehensive Senate reform achievable 
today, except, perhaps, one kind of comprehensive reform—abolition.”265 It was obvious from 
his testimony, however, that he preferred reform over abolition, as he stated that “I will be frank 
in saying that I tend to think of a future Senate in terms of it being an elected body” and that 
“anything short of a democratic electoral process would fall short of what we ultimately need on 
accountability.”266 But this change would come about informally because “there is no doubt that 
to change the process in a formal constitutional sense—the making senators elected—would 
require provincial consent.”267 And provincial consent would be unachievable on that issue 
without triggering wholesale constitutional reform that would be doomed from the start. 
 
 The ultimate goal, for the prime minister, was a fully elected Senate. To him, Senate term 
limits were “an interim step of democratization”268 that would later lead to consultative elections 
and rebalancing provincial representation in the Senate, both of which the Conservative 
government would pursue unilaterally in light of the difficulty of formal amendment. As to the 
imbalance in provincial representation, the prime minister acknowledged that “in the future, we 
will have to address this problem but at the same time, the government has to choose a staged 
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approach.”269 Provincial representation “is perhaps the most difficult issue” in Senate reform 
“and for this reason, the government did not start with this step. The government started first 
with terms and secondly with an election process.”270 For him, reforming provincial 
representation and the powers of the Senate “must be addressed through a general amending 
formula, constitutional amendment”271 but changes to Senate term limits and creating senatorial 
elections could be done by Parliament acting unilaterally. 
 
The prime minister was right as a matter of political expedience—it would be easier and 
more politically profitable for him to change the Senate legislatively than constitutionally—but 
he was wrong on the Constitution. Nevertheless, his long-term plan to reverse-engineer 
senatorial elections was shrewd but democratically illegitiamte. Concerned that pursuing Senate 
reform via formal amendment would necessarily have failed in light of provincial dissensus on 
the large-scale constitutional revision that would have inevitably followed from a formal 
amendment proposal on senator selection, the Conservative government chose instead to pursue 
its Senate reforms without defining it as a formal amendment. By creating a framework for 
consultative senatorial elections to generate candidates for prime ministerial nomination to the 
Senate—which as I have argued above would have matured from a voluntary prime ministerial 
practice into a binding prime ministerial convention272—the Conservative government would 
have bound present and future political actors. Present and future provincial political actors 
would have been coerced by the democracy principle into adopting and subsequently adhering to 
the framework for consultative senatorial elections because their constituents would have 
demanded the continuing right to select their senators. And future prime ministers would 
themselves have been coerced by the democracy principle and prior political practice to follow 
the initially-voluntary prime ministerial practice of nominating winning candidates to the Senate.  
 
 Over time as the practice matured into a convention, the Senate would have become 
reconstituted in its composition, and as a result of its new composition, in its democratic 
legitimacy and legislative function. As to its composition, the Senate would have changed from a 
wholly appointed body to a de facto elected one. senators would have as a technical matter 
remained appointed to the Senate by the Governor General on the advice of the prime minister. 
But, functionally, appointment would have occurred at the provincial level in consultative 
senatorial elections whose outcome would have effectively determined for the prime minister 
whom to nominate to the Governor General. An effectively elected Senate would have accrued 
the democratic legitimacy that it lacks today, a transformation in status that could in turn have 
emboldened senators to take a more active role in the legislative process.273 Where the appointed 
Senate now commonly assents to the House of Commons absent rare exceptions, an elected 
Senate might no longer treat its assent to the House as the simple formality it currently is.274  
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The evolution of Parliament from into two elected chambers, each claiming some 
measure of democratic legitimacy, would have redesigned Canadian parliamentary government 
in a way not constitutionally achievable without formal amendment. Those changes would have 
bred anticipated as well as unintended legislative, partisan, geographic and institutional 
implications.275 It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail the transformative changes caused 
by an elected Senate.276 It is generally understood, though, that “an elected Senate would thus 
constitute a major change that could only be done by means of a constitutional amendment and a 
full revision of the operation not only of the Senate, but of the government as a whole.”277 
Whatever the consequences of the major changes occasioned by an elected Senate, the key point 
is that the constitutional transformation would have arisen informally as a result of the 
Conservative government’s ordinary legislation to create a framework for consultative elections.  
 
Constitutional changes of this magnitude should occur through the formal, public, 
contestable, and democracy-enhancing and -preserving channels of constitutional amendment. 
As the Court recognized in the Senate Reference, amending senator selection must be done 
through the multilateral amendment procedures entrenched in Section 38, not the unilateral 
federal amendment power in Section 44.278 The reason why, however, which the Court did not 
develop, is that changes to the basic framework of government—like the introduction of 
consultative senatorial elections—must be legitimated by successfully navigating the intricate 
procedures of formal amendment designed to express the informed aggregated choices of 
political actors in their capacity as responsible representatives of the electorate. Yet, had they 
been successful, the informal and irregular procedures deployed by the Conservative government 
would have obscured the reality and extent of its intended constitutional changes. They were 
insufficiently predictable, they lacked transparency, and they inhibited public accountability. 
C. The Costs and Consequences of Stealth 
 
Entrenching major constitutional reforms by stealth comes at a cost. There are costs even 
where the attempt to amend the constitution by stealth ultimately fails, as here with the 
repudiated proposal for consultative senatorial elections. For example, there are political costs to 
the moral standing of the governing party and to its trustworthiness as perceived by citizens and 
opposing political actors when its nonconstitutional tactics of stealth amendment are brought to 
light. But those political costs are not the focus of this Section. I am instead interested here in 
how stealth amendments to national institutions affect parliamentary, provincial and popular 
actors in discharging their obligations in the process of constitutional change. In my view, stealth 
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amendment denies them their democratic right to participate in constitutional change, and 
thereby degrades what is designed to be a public, deliberative, representative and collaborative 
process into a closed, arbitrary, unrepresentative and deeply problematic one. In this Section, I 
explore the costs and consequences of stealth amendment, and evaluate why it is problematic for 
the rule of law in a constitutional democracy. First, however, I begin by distinguishing stealth 
amendment from other forms of conventional constitutional change. 
  
1. Stealth Amendment and Ordinary Conventional Change 
 
Scholars of comparative public law might draw similarities between the phenomenon of 
constitutional amendment by stealth in Canada and the expansion of presidential war powers in 
the United States. Indeed, they might argue that the now-common presidential practice of 
committing the armed forces into conflict abroad without a congressional declaration of war has 
affected not only what Stephen Griffin has referred to as “an amendment-level change to the 
constitutional order outside the [formal] amendment process”279 but more specifically an 
informal amendment by stealth. This is not an implausible comparison. After all, Presidents have 
routinely deployed troops into combat without seeking congressional approval,280 in apparent 
violation of the United States Constitution’s textual command that only “Congress shall have 
power to … declare War.”281 And as the practice has persisted, it has created precedents upon 
which succeeding presidents have relied to legitimate the choice to deploy the armed forces 
without formal congressional approval.282 This has informally entrenched the presidential 
prerogative to circumvent the Declaration of War Clause, and all of this occurred by stealth. 
This, at least, would be nature of the parallel drawn by scholars of comparative public law. 
 
Yet there is something distinctive about constitutional amendment by stealth that makes it 
an inappropriate category of informal constitutional change into which to classify the informal 
amendment of presidential war powers. At the origins of stealth amendment are self-consciously 
undertaken actions to exercise official authority in a manner that will make it politically 
unpalatable for successors to refuse to conform their conduct to that action and therefore to alter 
constitutional practice without a new textual writing. The objective of stealth amendment is to 
impose an unwritten non-legal political obligation on future political actors to follow a certain 
course of action that they may not necessarily have chosen for themselves absent the constraint 
forced upon them by a previous political actor who, by deliberate conduct, has narrowed the 
range of choices successors have in discharging the duties of their office. It is important to stress 
that the obligation is not a legal one, inasmuch as it is nowhere entrenched in a constitutional or 
legislative text nor has it been legitimated by popular or legislative measures. It is a purely 
political obligation, though its effect approximates a binding legal responsibility. 
 
The modern presidential prerogative to commit the armed forces into combat with a 
congressional declaration of war may in fact have informally amended the Constitution, but it 
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has not occurred stealthily. Presidents have not actively sought to alter constitutional practice, 
nor can we trace the origin of this presidential prerogative to a self-consciously undertaken 
decision to act in manner that would create a binding expectation that successor presidents would 
have no politically acceptable alternative but to follow the precedent set by the original actor.  
 
Rather, it seems that the presidential prerogative to deploy troops without a congressional 
declaration of war was born of congressional self-interest to disclaim responsibility for 
presidential commitments abroad and to instead push any potential blame to the president.283 
Congress’ refusal to exercise its constitutional power to insist on a declaration of war has left the 
president with almost unencumbered authority to wage war.284 And presidents, for their part, 
“have been willing to accept responsibility for wars only after Congress thrust it upon them 
because its members decided that blame avoidance was the winning political strategy.”285 Today, 
questions remain about whether congressional declarations of war are a necessary condition of 
the use of military force abroad. But the president nonetheless continues to engage the armed 
forces in foreign conflicts without congressional declarations,286 as he has since the Second 
World War—the last time Congress formally declared war.287 The president does so, however, 
not because of a political or legal obligation foisted upon him by a predecessor. This informal 
change in constitutional practice cannot therefore be described as having occurred by stealth.288 
 
We may also contrast the creation of the two-term convention on presidential tenure prior 
to the entrenchment of the Twenty-Second Amendment with the creation of a constitutional 
amendment by stealth. It is a subtle distinction, but the difference between the introduction of 
consultative senatorial elections and the emergence of the two-term limit accentuates the 
essential feature of stealth amendment: intent. Whereas both convention and stealth amendment 
arise out of political practice over time as a function of continuity, convenience, or even 
perceived though not deliberate compulsion, we can discern at the point of origin of a stealth 
amendment the deliberate intent of political actors to create an unwritten norm that will coerce 
their successors into conforming their conduct to the practice. Such a coercive intent is not 
present in the normal course of conduct that ultimately becomes informally entrenched as a 
convention. But it this intent that defines the core of what I identify as a stealth amendment. 
 
The Twenty-Second Amendment imposes a two-term limit on the president. By its terms, 
“no person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice … .”289 The period 
between its conception and entrenchment was rather short at four years: proposed in 1947 and 
ratified in 1951, the impetus behind the amendment was the unprecedented fourth term to which 
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President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had been elected in 1944.290 Although there is truth to the 
claim that Roosevelt’s Republican adversaries intended the amendment as “a belated slap at 
him”291 and as a deeply partisan expression of dissent to his enacted legislative programs,292 the 
larger purpose of the Twenty-Second Amendment was to thwart the rise of an imperial 
presidency that would accumulate power at the expense of the other branches.293 
 
But well before the Twenty-Second Amendment formally bound presidents to serving 
only two terms, presidents believed themselves bound by that rule, and third parties likewise 
understood presidents to be bound by it. Politicians and commentators saw the two-term limit as 
“normatively obligatory, central to the maintenance of the U.S. constitutional project” and 
therefore much “more than just an observed historical pattern.”294 No court would have enforced 
the rule, but as Dicey wrote it possessed “in practice nearly the force of law.”295 The reason why 
recalls our analysis of the creation of a constitutional convention. There had emerged over time a 
convention pursuant to which presidents would not seek a third term.296 We can trace the origin 
of this convention to the first president of the United States, George Washington, who chose not 
to run for reelection after serving two full terms.297 In declining to seek a third term in 1796, 
Washington began what was an initially self-policed practice of voluntary presidential 
resignation that later became accepted as a tradition of informal presidential term limits as 
president after president followed the Washington precedent.298 Scholars have recognized that 
the Washington precedent was the basis for creating a convention limiting presidents to two 
consecutive elected terms in office.299 
 
The key point for our comparative study of stealth amendment is how the Washington 
precedent matured into a convention. Washington did not refuse to run for a third consecutive 
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term in order to model the behavior he intended his successors to follow. He declined to run, 
although he likely would have won, because he wished to retire to private life, not out of duty, 
nor a sense of constitutional propriety nor an intent to coerce future presidents into respecting his 
two-term tradition.300 As Bruce Peabody explains, Washington was not “the willful founder of a 
custom of presidential term limit,” a claim that scholars have commonly made.301 Indeed, 
political scientist Paul Davis observes that “there is ample evidence that he never expected or 
desired his refusal to become a precedent for later Presidents.”302 This did not prevent political 
actors from pointing to the Washington precedent as a model of selfless leadership to which 
others should aspire. As each of Washington’s two-term successors from Thomas Jefferson 
through Andrew Jackson chose one after another not to seek a third consecutive elected term 
despite there being no textual rule standing in the way,303 the two-term limit grew by the late 
nineteenth century into “an unwritten constitutional norm” such that public resistance greeted 
any president who publicly considered departing from it.304  
 
The two-term convention did not arise by stealth. To draw an analogy, “just as legal 
precedents acquire their meanings in subsequent decisions,” so too the Washington precedent 
grew into a convention “primarily in the hands of his successors.”305 The two-term convention 
arose as conventions ordinarily do: on the strength of the sustained repetition of the accepted 
practices of political actors. Over time, succeeding presidents imputed to Washington’s 
precedent a principled basis that Washington had not himself intended, namely of the importance 
of rotating the presidency in the service of democracy and of guarding against the concentration 
of power in a single office.306 Term limits, they argued and indeed believed, would frustrate the 
potential for tyranny and would better ensure the health and vitality of the president.307 The 
democracy principle was therefore only retroactively applied to justify the two-term convention. 
 
Here, there is both contrast and continuity with the stealth amendment unsuccessfully 
pursued by the Conservative government. As a matter of contrast, the proposed framework of 
consultative senatorial elections was designed specifically with the intent to compel future prime 
ministers to follow the model set by the incumbent prime minister. The continued repetition of 
the practice of senatorial nomination would have become a convention as future prime ministers 
followed the precedent intentionally set by their predecessor. The continuity between the stealth 
amendment and the Washingtonian two-term convention is centered on democratic principle: the 
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same reason that explains why prime ministers would be powerless to depart from the 
convention of nominating winning consultative senatorial election candidates explains why 
Washington’s successors could not themselves depart from his two-term precedent. Just as 
Washington’s precedent was supported by the principle of democracy—on the theory that term-
limits prevent the concentration of power—the convention on prime ministerial senate 
nominations would likewise have grown to be supported by democratic principle, here the 
democratic interest of citizens to vote for their senators. The difference, however, is that the 
Washington precedent was only later imbued with democratic virtue. In contrast, the prime 
ministerial practice of nominating winning election candidates would have been designed from 
the beginning to become a convention on the strength of its unimpeachable democratic veneer. 
 
2. Constitutional Integrity and Democratic Legitimacy 
 
But suppose Washington had intended his refusal to run for a third term to be a model for 
successors, and assume that he had invoked the democracy principle to justify his self-imposed 
term limit. Further suppose that Washington’s successors had followed his precedent such that, 
over time, the two-term limit had matured into a convention, just as Washington had strategically 
planned. Even this counterfactual wrinkle of Washington’s intent would have been insufficient to 
classify this new convention as a stealth amendment. This highlights another important criterion 
for constitutional amendment by stealth: circumvention of the constitutional text.308 
 
A stealth amendment occurs where political actors calculate that it is too difficult to 
formally amend the constitution. Political actors consequently turn their attention to intentionally 
creating a constitutional convention through repeated political practice. The result is an informal 
constitutional amendment unlike others: ordinarily, an informal amendment arises with the 
affirmative approval or acquiescence of political actors engaged in dialogic interactions, and this 
informal amendment can therefore claim some democratic legitimacy from its origin in political 
agreement. But although a stealth amendment is a similarly unwritten though binding 
amendment, it is achieved through an irregular process of compulsion designed to obscure its 
intended effect until it is too late to deny the democratic legitimacy retrospectively assigned to it.  
 
What made the Conservative government’s proposed framework of consultative 
senatorial elections irregular is its careful design to circumvent the Constitution of Canada’s 
formal amendment rules for changing senator selection. As I have explained at greater length 
elsewhere,309 the Constitution requires political actors to successfully navigate the onerous 
multilateral amendment procedure in Section 38 in order to change the method of selecting 
senators.310 This textual command is reinforced by the history and architecture of formal 
amendment in Canada as well as the spirit of Canadian federalism.311 Yet the Conservative 
government sought to make this historic change to Canadian federalism with its narrow and 
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relatively easy (given its parliamentary majority) unilateral formal amendment power in Section 
44.312 Cloaking the significance of the change under the cover of a simple statute was intended to 
convey the impression that the intended change was not as significant as it really was.  
 
The Supreme Court ultimately stopped the Conservative government from amending the 
Constitution by stealth. But had the Court approved the Conservative government’s use of 
Section 44, it would have become a political impossibility, though not a legal one, to remove 
from citizens the power to select their own senators by the time successor political actors had 
recognized that they had become compelled to follow the political practice of nominating the 
winning senatorial election candidates. This practice would have matured into a constitutional 
convention. Two things would have made this stealth amendment even more troubling: first, that 
the convention would have been arisen out of a deliberate effort to circumvent the formal rules of 
constitutional amendment that prescribe how to create an elected Senate; and second, that the 
convention would have grown to possess democratic legitimacy without having at its point of 
origin conformed to our expectations for democratic government under the rule of law. 
 
In a constitutional democracy governed by a written constitution with rules for formally 
amending the document, political actors should abide by the textual rules for constitutional 
change where the change they seek to effect is governed by a clear rule. Circumventing the 
constitutional text, as the Conservative government tried to do in its Senate reforms, degrades the 
constitution and undermines the rule of law. It degrades the constitution by signaling to political 
actors and the public that the constitutional text does not in fact bind in all cases, and that its 
authoritativeness is contingent on the political preferences of the governing party. It moreover 
undermines the rule of law for the reasons elaborated above: it fails the tests of predictability, 
transparency and accountability.313 
 
The act of amending the constitution should reflect the considered judgment of the 
political community and the popular legitimacy that only deliberative procedures can confer. In 
the classical Lockean tradition of representative government, a constitutional amendment 
expresses the consent of the governed, and the granting of its consent legitimizes the amendment 
its representatives have effected in its name.314 In this respect, a constitutional amendment is an 
event of “high moment” in the life of a constitutional democracy insofar as it commonly requires 
an extraordinary measure legislative or popular agreement, or both.315 It is “a fundamental act of 
popular sovereignty,”316 recourse to which is a reminder to political actors that constitutional 
legitimacy derives from the direct or mediated consent of public institutions and citizens acting 
in concert to give meaning to the constitution.317   
 
Where one governmental institution, here the governing majority in the House of 
Commons, arrogates to itself and denies others the power of constitutional amendment—a 
collateral consequence of stealth amendment—there is a cost to the Constitution of Canada. 
                                                 
312
 Ibid. 
313
 See supra Section IV.B. 
314
 See Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 1990) at 21. 
315
 See Richard Albert, “Nonconstitutional Amendments” (2009) 12 Can. J. L & Juris. 5 at 5. 
316
 Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 6. 
317
 See Richard Albert, “Constitutional Handcuffs” (2010) 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 664 at 665. 
RICHARD ALBERT                 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2015)                    STEALTH AMENDMENT 
 
44 | P a g e  
 
Circumventing the textual strictures of the Constitution’s formal amendment rules in order to do 
informally what it commands must be done formally diminishes the integrity of the Constitution 
as it becomes perceived as an ineffective constraint on political actors. There is an equally 
troubling cost to democracy in Canada where political actors engage in stealth amendment: it 
divests the practice of amendment of its public, deliberative, opinion-aggregating, democracy-
enhancing and democracy-in-action properties. Stealth amendment therefore has no claim to the 
democratic legitimacy ordinarily associated with a constitutional amendment insofar as the only 
legitimacy a stealth amendment might enjoy is assigned retrospectively as a function of its 
substantive content alone rather than both its procedural and substantive merit.  
 
3. Intergenerational Precommitment 
 
What validates a formal amendment is not its content alone but also the process by which 
it comes into existence. Where differently constituted majorities overcome the formal barriers to 
lawful constitutional change, the change itself is validated by two forms of legitimacy, both of 
which are lacking in stealth amendment. First, the change is validated by the sociological 
legitimacy of the relevant publics accepting it, either affirmatively or by acquiescence, as 
justified and deserving of support.318 Second, the change is validated by the legal legitimacy of 
satisfying the entrenched standard to create new commitments.319 Meeting that standard is 
important to keep fidelity with the binding commitments made by the authoring generation.320 
 
Stealth amendment lacks the sociological and legal legitimacy that formal amendments 
possess by virtue of their successful satisfaction of special legislative and/or popular thresholds. 
This void calls into question whether a stealth amendment can properly do what a constitutional 
amendment is supposed to, which is to bind future generations. A strong reason to accept new 
political commitments created by a constitutional amendment is that the amendment likely 
required some measure of supermajority agreement expressed at one or more points in time.321 
There is even greater reason to accept as valid new political commitments where the amendment 
procedures used to formalize the change are designed to reflect the considered judgments of all 
parts of the constitutional community.322 But in the absence of sociological and legal legitimacy, 
the reasons that commonly justify binding future generations to a constitutional change become 
less relevant. This intergenerational dimension of constitutional change remains understudied but 
it offers a further avenue for understanding the costs and consequences of stealth amendment.323  
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Here, the binding quality of the prime ministerial convention on senatorial nomination 
would have taken root fraudulently, without having earned the sociological and legal legitimacy 
that we commonly associate with a constitutional change of that significance. Neither political 
actors nor the relevant publics acting through their representatives would have been afforded 
their constitutionally-entrenched right to openly express or withhold their freely-given consent to 
this substantial modification to the composition and function of the Parliament of Canada. It 
would therefore lack sociological legitimacy, just as it would lack legal legitimacy in light of the 
governing party’s circumvention of the textually prescribed rules for making this change to 
Canada’s basic constitutional structure. This would in turn deny the convention the democratic 
authority it needs in order to legitimately bind future generations. Paradoxically, however, the 
convention would possess independent moral legitimacy anchored in the democracy principle. 
Notwithstanding the democratically deficient manner in which the convention would have arisen, 
senatorial elections would have democratic merit and would be worth supporting. This is why 
stealth amendment must be discouraged: it tempts us to forgive the means in light of the ends. 
But in constitutional democracy rooted in the rule of law, the means must always be legitimate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Informal amendment is common in constitutional democracies, including in Canada 
where it occurs by judicial interpretation, statutory law, and also by political practice.324 Stealth 
amendment is a species of informal amendment but it differs from these conventional forms of 
informal amendment on one important point: the intent to coerce successors into compliance. 
Stealth amendment is a deliberate response to the difficulty of formally amending the 
Constitution. Recognizing that formal amendment is improbable given the obduracy of formal 
amendment rules, political actors circumvent the public, transparent, predictable and 
constitutionally required rules for formal amendment and instead proceed through informal and 
irregular procedures to affect a material change to the Constitution of Canada. Political actors 
self-consciously establish a new democratic political practice whose repetition is intended to 
compel their successors into compliance with that practice. 
 
Notwithstanding whether the new political practice may improve or diminish democratic 
outcomes, the new practice is not born out of democratic procedures. It is instead an effort to 
evade the formal legitimacy-conferring and democracy-promoting procedures of constitutional 
amendment that are designed to express the informed aggregated choices of political actors. Over 
time, this repeated political practice matures into a constitutional convention which becomes 
informally entrenched in the constitution, yet without the democratic legitimacy we commonly 
associate with constitutional amendments. This stealth amendment takes root even as political 
actors convey the impression that no such change is actually occurring. 
 
Informal amendment serves important democratic interests but stealth amendment fails to 
serve any of them. Constitutional amendment by stealth is an informal yet irregular process of 
constitutional change that excludes opposing political actors and the people from what is 
intended to be a deliberative exercise in self-definition. It divests both the process and its 
eventual product of democratic legitimacy, it denies political actors and the people their 
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fundamental right to democracy, and it moreover degrades what should be a public and 
collaborative procedure into a closed and autocratic one. All of this threatens to devalue the 
constitutional text and to undermine the rule of law. It is difficult to find any redeeming 
constitutional virtue in the politically expedient tactic of constitutional amendment by stealth. 
  
 The Conservative government tried unsuccessfully to amend senator selection by stealth. 
In the Senate Reference, the Supreme Court advised the Conservative government that its 
proposal for introducing consultative senatorial elections would not satisfy the standard the 
Constitution of Canada sets for constitutional change. Yet in denying the Conservative 
government its stealth amendment to the Senate, the Court missed an opportunity to bring to 
light the larger and more fundamental constitutional infirmities with the Conservative 
government’s Senate reform ambitions. The problem was not that the Conservative government 
had proposed to introduce consultative senatorial elections. Modernizing the Senate into an 
elected body is a good idea to consider. Rather, the problem is how the Conservative government 
had proposed to introduce consultative senatorial elections—by stealth, in violation of the 
democratic values of transparency, accountability and predictability in the rule of law.  
 
In this Article, I have suggested why we should resist constitutional amendment by 
stealth. I have explained and illustrated the phenomenon of constitutional amendment by stealth, 
I have theorized how it emerges in a constitutional democracy, I have posited its interrelation to 
constitutional rigidity and political impasse, and I have identified its distinguishing features in 
comparative and theoretical perspectives.  
 
We have not seen the last effort to amend the Constitution by stealth. In light of the 
memorable failures of large-scale constitutional reform in Canada, political actors are unlikely to 
embark on similarly grand efforts for wholesale constitutional revision. Yet the same problems 
that led to those failed efforts persist today, unsolved and perhaps as vexing as ever. Incumbents 
might in the future seek to make incremental progress on Canada’s constitutional challenges by 
using the Constitution’s public, deliberative and contestable procedures to engage all political 
actors and the public in some respect. Or they could alternatively, once again, pursue these 
changes by stealth. Now that we are equipped with a standard and vocabulary to understand 
constitutional amendment by stealth, we can better monitor political actors who may be tempted 
to change the Constitution of Canada illegitimately outside of the legitimate mechanisms of 
informal amendment and the formal procedures prescribed by the constitutional text. 
